What is an "adverse action?"

If you are an employment discrimination victim or a whistleblower who suffered retaliation at the hands of your employer, to have an opportunity to recover you must show you suffered an “adverse action.” Some things that feel adverse to you are not necessarily “adverse actions” that will give rise to a case. On the other hand, an employer is wrong if it tells you that only a termination or a demotion is an “adverse action.”

If you were terminated, laid off, demoted, or in some other way lost pay as a result of the employer’s discriminatory or retaliatory action against you, then you suffered an adverse action. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 24 Cal.AppAth 317, 355 (“termination, demotion, or denial of an available job " is adverse action); Thomas v. Department of Corrections (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 507, 511 (termination of employment and demotion are adverse actions); McRae v. Dep't of Corrections and Rehab. (2006) 142 Cal.AppAth 377, 393 (action that results in a reduction in pay satisfies requirement); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 301 F.3d 958, 970 (pay cut is adverse employment action).

This is true even if the employer subsequently took some action to mitigate its damages. For example, in a case on which Bryan Schwartz Law recently defeated an employer’s summary judgment motion, the employer argued that, because our client was hired into another position after she was initially laid off, she did not suffer an adverse action. The employer’s argument failed. If you suffered a materially adverse consequence – even if it is relatively small, based on some type of mitigation – this should be sufficient to constitute an adverse action.

Likewise, if you are placed in a position with less advancement potential, fewer promotion opportunities, a less distinguished title, or suffered some other material loss of benefits or significantly diminished material responsibilities, you may have suffered an adverse action. See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2416 (2006)(reassignment to less desirable job responsibilities may be materially adverse action); Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1389-1390 (lateral transfer without change in wages, benefits and duties may be an adverse employment action where the transfer is in reality a demotion, or there are significantly diminished material responsibilities); Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1456-1457 (diminished promotion opportunities is adverse action).

A hostile working environment can constitute an “adverse action.” It is also true, though, that “social slights” or “mere reduction in pleasantries” are not enough, usually, to constitute an adverse action, standing alone – though they may be important background evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. On the other hand, both California and Federal courts will look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether the work environment or your job has been sufficiently for an adverse action to be established. See Yanowitz v. L 'Oreal USA, Inc.

(2005) 36 Ca1.4th 1028, 1055 ("no requirement that an employer's retaliatory acts constitute one swift blow, rather than a series of subtle, yet damaging, injuries”).

The Federal standard to prove that a retaliatory adverse action occurred is easier to meet than the California standard, as articulated in Yanowitz. In Federal courts, you may be able to prove an adverse action if you can show that the employer took any action against you which might tend to discourage a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ray decision suggests that, if your former employer where you previously complained of discrimination or blew the whistle retaliates by giving a negative job reference to a different potential employer (even if you ultimately get the job you were seeking), this can be an adverse action, because it might tend to discourage people from speaking out against discrimination or other unlawful activities. Id. at 1242.

If you believe you may have been subjected to an adverse employment action based on discrimination or whistleblower retaliation, and want to speak to a lawyer, contact www.BryanSchwartzLaw.com today.

Good New Case Law on Using Testimony from Other Victims in Harassment Cases:

Fifth District Court of Appeal Gets it Right in Pantoja v. Anton, 198 Cal.App.4th 87 (2011)

On August 9, 2011, the Fifth District released a strong published opinion on “me too” evidence, and other evidentiary issues in sexual harassment and race discrimination cases. Pantoja v. Anton, 198 Cal.App.4th 87 (2011). This opinion injects a much-needed dose of common sense into the law around proving that harassment occurred—something that is often a “he said-she said” situation.

The plaintiff, Lorraine Pantoja sued her former employer, Thomas Anton, under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act for sex and race discrimination and harassment, among other claims, while she was employed as a receptionist/secretary in Mr. Anton’s law office. Id. at *12. Ms. Pantoja alleged that Mr. Anton engaged in the following conduct, among other acts: slapping Ms. Pantjo’s buttocks, touching her leg while offering $200, referring to his employees as “my Mexicans,” and ultimately calling Ms. Pantoja a “stupid bitch” and then firing her. 198 Cal.App.4th 87, at *2.

At trial, the trial court in Kern County refused to admit evidence from Ms. Pantoja’s female coworkers of Anton’s conduct towards them that was not necessarily witnessed by Ms. Pantoja. Id. at *4. Ms. Pantoja sought to admit this “me too” evidence to show that Mr. Anton engaged in a pattern of harassment and race discrimination against his female, often Latina employees. Id. at *6. This evidence included extensive testimony from other employees that Mr. Anton inappropriately touched them, said things like “monkeys can do your job better than you,” telling a female employee on a ladder “I could see right through that skirt,” and “I have three Mexicans working for me. I’ve never had that many working for me before. Usually you hire Mexicans to do your maid work.” Id. at *8-9. However the Court reasoned that such “me too” evidence ran afoul of California’s evidence rules against “character evidence” and prevented the jury from hearing this testimony.^[1]

However, the trial court allowed Mr. Anton to admit evidence supporting his general course of conduct. For example, the court allowed Mr. Anton’s lawyers to lead him to testimony that any physical contact with his employees was merely “avuncular” or “uncle like.” Id. at *8. This testimony was not limited to the time that Ms. Pantoja was employed. Id.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court committed error by allowing what was essentially a double standard in favor of Mr. Anton:

We conclude that, in the event this case is retried, both parties need to be given the opportunity to present their evidence in an even-handed manner. Only then will the jury be able to fulfill its responsibility of determining where the truth actually lies based on a balanced and accurate review of admissible evidence.

Id. at *25. Importantly, the Court also found that the trial court erred in that “[its] decision that all evidence supporting a sexual harassment plaintiff's case must be limited to evidence of specific events that took place in the plaintiff's presence[. This ruling] had the unfortunate result of skewing the evidence.” Id. at *23.

This decision is important for plaintiffs in harassment cases, since, absent such “me too” evidence from co-workers willing to tell the truth about harassment that they endured, harassing incidents are frequently merely “he said-she said” situations. Harassment often occurs one-on-one, without many other witnesses. Likewise, harassers are seldom foolish enough to commit their harassment in writing.

With this decision, the challenging task of proving that inappropriate touching occurred, or that inappropriate words were spoken, has been made a bit easier for harassment victims.

Read the opinion here: http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F058414.PDF

If you believe you have been harassed or discriminated against in your workplace, contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.

[1] See Cal. Evid. Code § 1101.

Bryan Schwartz Law Represents California Employment Lawyers Association to California Supreme Court

Amicus Brief Argues for Reversal of Kirby, et al. v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., Shifting Burden of Defendants' Attorneys Fees to Plaintiffs in Unsuccessful Meal-Rest Period Premium Litigation

Click here to read the brief Bryan Schwartz Law submitted to the California Supreme Court on July 11, 2011, as amicus curiae on behalf of the California Employment Lawyers Association, an organization of approximately 1,000 attorneys representing workers throughout California in wage and hour, discrimination, whistleblower, and other types of cases.

The brief argues that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kirby, et al. v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., 113 Cal.Rptr. 370 (2010), review granted November 17, 2010 (Case Number S185827) ("Kirby"), would destroy workers' ability to sue to recover unpaid meal and rest period premiums, when employers steal time from them during their breaks.

Kirby disregarded the extensive Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring construction of the California Labor Code in the most protective manner to employees that is possible, based on a reasonable interpretation of the language of the statutes. In reversing, the Supreme Court should hold that Kirby erred in reading California Labor Code section 218.5, which provides for two-way fee-shifting in cases other than those encompassed in California Labor Code section 1194, to apply to meal and rest period premium cases under California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512 and the Wage Orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission.

Specifically, California Labor Code section 1194 allows only one-way fee-shifting - i.e., that an employer found to violate the law must pay the attorneys' fees of the person who brought the claim, but the opposite is not true. California Labor Code section 1194 includes claims for overtime and for "the legal minimum wage." In Murphy v. Kenneth Cole (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1109-1110, the California Supreme Court found that the meal and rest period premiums required under Section 226.7, etc.(an additional hour of pay at an employee's regular rate) are wages. Thus, they are the legal minimum wage that an employer must pay whenever an employee misses breaks, and Section 1194 is applicable.

The decision also erred in reading section 218.5's preclusion of two-way attorneys' fees shifting in "any action" seeking compensation under section 1194 to be limited only to the cause of action alleging overtime and "legal minimum wage" claims, instead of the whole civil action. Since meal/rest claims are generally brought together with overtime and other minimum wage violation claims, it only makes sense for "any action" in section 218.5 to refer to the whole case. Otherwise, it is unclear what will happen when someone loses a case in which a worker says that he/she missed meal periods, and as a result, had unpaid overtime as well - i.e., worked through lunch periods, so actually worked 8.5 hours a day, instead of the maximum 8 regular hours, but never got paid overtime for the extra half hour.

Employees should not be forced to pay their employers' attorneys' fees every time their cases to enforce the law do not succeed. Simply put - neither they, nor their lawyers, could afford the risk, and as such, the consequence of Kirby would be to kill litigation seeking to enforce the meal and rest period premium laws of California. With the government enforcement agencies seriously understaffed, private enforcement is the only way to give employees a fighting chance of enforcing their rights to either receive meal and rest periods in California workplaces, or be paid premiums by their employers.

When Your Employer Must Pay for Your Travel Time

In general, an employer does not need to compensate you for time spent traveling that is a normal commute from home to work and back. However, there are a couple of key exceptions. Under California law, one exception is when an employer requires you to take company-provided transportation and you are subject to the control of the employer. See Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 578 (2000).

In the Morillion case, the employer, Royal Packing Co., required its employee farm workers to meet for work each day at parking lots or assembly areas. Id. at 579. From these departure points, Royal transported employees to their job sites in busses which Royal provided and for which Royal paid, and returned them to the departure points at the end of the each day. Id. The employees were prohibited from using their own transportation to get to the job sites. Id. The California Supreme Court found the level of Royal’s control over its employees meant they should have been on the clock while on the busses, since the employees could not commute to the job sites on their own, decide which route to take, or which mode of transportation to use. Id. at 586-87. The Morillion decision means that an employer must compensate employees for their compulsory travel time, including time spent waiting for your employer’s transportation to take you to work. See id. at 587.

It is true that an employer may provide and require you to take a company vehicle without having to compensate you for travel time. However, if the employer subjects you to restrictions, such as not permitting personal stops, forbidding you from picking up passengers, and forbidding the use of a cell phone except to answer calls from company headquarters, the employer may be liable for that travel time. See Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc., 596 F.3d 1046, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2010).

In general, if you take advantage of optional company-provided transportation, your employer does not need to pay you for travel time. See Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal. App. 4th 263, 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). For example, Disney did not have to compensate employees for the time they spent on a free, optional shuttle bus provided by Disney from the employee parking lot to the entrance of Disneyland. Id. The Disneyland employees could take alternative forms of transportation, such as taking public transportation, a vanpool, or getting dropped off, so they were not under Disney’s control. Id.

You might also be entitled to compensation for travel time under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act if you perform any work that is deemed to be an “integral and indispensable” part of your main work activities. D A & S Oil Well Servicing, Inc. v. Mitchell, 262 F.2d 552, 555 (10th Cir. 1958). Such activities include picking up and transporting necessary equipment or receiving work instructions at a meeting point prior to traveling to the work site. See, e.g., Smith v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 462 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, you should almost always get paid for travel time from job site to job site in a single day, assuming that such travel is not a part of your normal commute from home to the normal job site, or between home and the first or last job site. See Wirtz v. Sherman Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 746, 753 (D. Md. 1964). For example, employees who install cable, make repairs to telephone lines, inspect houses, or wait to receive the next limousine driving assignment are all entitled to be paid for the time they spend getting to one work site to another. See Steelman v. Telco Tel. Co., 2001 WL 21361, at *1, 3 (D. Or. Jan. 5, 2001); Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1527-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).

If you believe you are not receiving proper compensation for travel time between job sites, or for travel time where your employer requires you to meet at mandatory location prior to traveling to your job site, or if your employer restricts what you do when you travel to or from work, or imposes work requirements on you during this travel time, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

For Government Contract Employees, Your Employer is Not Just Who Signs the Paycheck

You were interviewed and hired by a private firm, but sent to work at a government agency as a government contractor. You report your hours, receive healthcare benefits, and receive your paycheck from the firm, but your office is at the government agency. The growth and popularity of government contract workers at various local and federal government agencies may lead to confusion about who is technically the “employer.” When government contract employees have an unlawful termination claim, whether due to discrimination or harassment, whistleblower, retaliation, or overtime and other wage claims, both the private firm and the government agency could be on the hook as joint employers. Thus, a government contractor should pursue his or her claims against both entities if either the private sector employer or government agency mistreated the employee and violated state or federal law.

Courts determine whether a contract worker is deemed a government employee for purposes of an employment discrimination lawsuit by looking at whether the employer “has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer.” Lopez v. Johnson, 333 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted)); Strolberg v. Akal Sec. Co., 2005 WL 5629026, at *6 (D. Idaho Jan. 19, 2005). The courts look at “the extent of the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the worker’s performance [as] a primary factor,” as well as other factors including whether the employer furnished the employee’s equipment and place of work, the length of time the employee worked, and whether the work was an integral part of the employer’s business. Lopez at 962-63 (citing Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) and Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Mem’l Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1988)).

In Strolberg v. Akal Sec. Co., the court found employees of Akal Security Co., a private security company, to also be government employees of the United States Marshal’s Service (“USMS”) for purposes of a claim under the Rehabilitation Act – even though the USMS had limited control over the terms and conditions of the employees’ work. Strolberg at *1. Akal Security was responsible for managing court security officers’ (“CSO”) work hours and assignments, payment of salaries, and scheduling of vacation, discipline, and performance of services. Id. at 7. Also, the USMS did not normally direct CSOs’ activities nor have intent to enter into an employment relationship. Id. at *8. Yet, the court found the USMS to be the CSOs’ joint employer. Id. Examples indicating that the USMS was a joint employer included the USMS providing training; furnishing radio, weapons, handcuffs, and identification; determining routes, schedules, and operating procedures for CSO patrols and stations; and providing the premises where the CSOs worked. Id. at *7-8. The USMS could not directly fire CSOs, but could evaluate CSOs and direct CSOs in the event of emergencies. Id. at *8. The Strolberg case shows that the employer need not control everything about the contract worker’s employment, but just some significant aspect of it.

Be cautioned: the government may well try to tell you that you are not its employee, and that you have no right to file claims against it. Do not believe it. You should make sure that you register a complaint with the proper government authorities very quickly after you suffer an adverse employment action, because the government tends to have very short deadlines for filing complaints. Often, if you do not file against the government quickly, you will lose the right to hold the government accountable.

In one example, Bryan Schwartz Law’s client Garnett Gebhardt sought to hold both the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) and Northrop Grumman liable as joint employers for her claims of harassment and discrimination. Gebhardt v. Chu, 2010 WL 5211459, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010). While contracting firm Northrop Grumman signed Ms. Gebhardt’s paychecks and provided employee benefits, Ms. Gebhardt worked in DOE facilities, used a DOE email address, and worked directly under a Senior Counterintelligence Officer and federal employee. Id. With limited exceptions, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations require that federal employees (or federal contract employees) consult with the proper Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor at the agency within 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory in order to file a civil suit. Id. at *6.

In the Gebhardt case, although (before hiring Bryan Schwartz Law) Ms. Gebhardt complained to DOE officials and attempted multiple times to contact a DOE Human Relations Specialist in order to properly file an EEO complaint, the DOE took the position that Ms. Gebhardt never properly filed an administrative complaint against it. Id. at *3-4. The DOE argued that the DOE Human Resources Specialist was not an “EEO” official that was logically connected with the EEO process. Id.at *9. The DOE also argued that if there was an EEO complaint filed by Ms. Gebhardt, she had directed it to Northrop Grumman and not the DOE. Id. at 10. However, Bryan Schwartz Law successfully convinced the court that it should reject the DOE’s arguments that Ms. Gebhardt’s complaints were untimely (under the legal principle of equitable tolling) because Ms. Gebhardt and her counsel were told by the DOE that her complaint was being handled, even though it was not. Id. at *13.

Though Bryan Schwartz Law ultimately succeeded in saving her claims against the DOE, the Gebhardt case shows how important it is to be quick and persistent in pursuing your employment claims with the appropriate channels at both your government agency and contracting firm. The agency or firm may mislead you into filing a complaint with one employer only, or with an individual or office not charged with handling EEO complaints.

If you are unsure who your “employer” is or where to file a complaint, you could very well have joint employers and should pursue action against both. In particular, if you are a government contractor and you have a discrimination, whistleblower, or wage and hour claim arising out of either your contracting firm or government agency, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Civil Rights Lawyer and Employee Advocate Bryan Schwartz Speaks Out on NPR Against ATT Mobility v. Concepcion

On May 4, 2011, Bryan Schwartz (www.BryanSchwartzLaw.com) advocated the interests of employees and consumers in an hour-long radio broadcast, on National Public Radio, of a debate between Mr. Schwartz and Baldwin Lee, who is an employers'-side attorney and head of the Employment group at Allen Matkins.

To find out how ATT Mobility v. Concepcion will affect you, in your daily life - whether you know it or not - listen to Mr. Schwartz's points by clicking on the link below:

"Your Legal Rights: a Debate on the ATT Mobility v. Concepcion Supreme Court

Decision, and How it Affects Your Rights in the Workplace,"

May 4, 2011, National Public Radio, KALW San Francisco 91.7 FM.

Disability Rights Organizations Voice Support for Class Action on Behalf of Disabled Foreign Service Applicants

A consortium of more than 100 national, disability-related organizations joined in support of the class action which was certified in September 2010, seeking to end the United States Department of State’s practice of discrimination against people with disabilities, records of disabilities, and perceived disabilities in the hiring process for Foreign Service Officers. At the request of the State Department, the class certification decision in Meyer v. Clinton (Department of State), a case brought by Bryan Schwartz Law, is currently under review by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

The Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities wrote to the EEOC, addressing the State Department’s so-called “worldwide availability” policy, which required that applicants prove they are able to work at more than 250 diplomatic posts worldwide, without reasonable accommodations of any kind or need for ongoing medical treatment, before being hired into the Foreign Service. Thus, for example, an applicant (like the Class Agent, Ms. Meyer) who the State Department admitted was able to work at more than 85% of posts without any accommodations, could not be hired, at all, into the Foreign Service, without undergoing a special “waiver” process to prove he or she had “extraordinary qualifications” not required of other, non-disabled applicants. Only a tiny fraction of disabled applicants receive Foreign Service jobs after this discriminatory “waiver” process.

Though numerous court and EEOC decisions have found the application of the “worldwide availability” requirement unlawful, it has never been addressed on a class-wide basis. The Consortium’s letter stated, “The time has come to stop handling these challenges to a discriminatory policy piecemeal – and to address head-on the whole ‘worldwide availability requirement’ as implemented.”

Bryan Schwartz, attorney for the Class Agent, stated, “This support of the organized, disability rights community is critical. This Consortium is a major stakeholder in the EEOC’s performance of its mission to eliminate workplace discrimination, and I hope the EEOC will take the Consortium’s well-reasoned amicus letter very seriously – as it should.”

For more information about Meyer v. Clinton, contact Bryan Schwartz.

The complete letter reads as follows:

April 27, 2011
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
One NoMa Station
131 M Street, NE
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, DC 20507

Re: Amicus Letter in Support of Opposition to the Agency’s Appeal of Class Certification Decision in Meyer v. Clinton, OFO No. 07-2011-007; EEOC No. 570-2008-00018X

Dear Director Hadden:

The Rights Task Force, the Employment and Training Task Force and the International Task Force of the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) submit this amicus letter in support of the opposition to the agency’s appeal of the class certification decision in the above-referenced case. This case challenges the State Department’s practice, under its “worldwide availability” policy, of banning people with a variety of disabilities from Foreign Service officer positions.

The CCD is a coalition of more than 100 national disability-related organizations working together to advocate for national public policy that ensures full equality, self-determination, independence, empowerment, integration and inclusion of children and adults with disabilities in all aspects of society. The mission of the Rights Task Force of the CCD is to focus on civil rights and protections for people with disabilities, and for enforcement of rights provisions by federal agencies. The Employment and Training Task Force works on issues relevant to the employment of people with disabilities, particularly issues related to the programs and projects funded under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. The International Task Force advocates for United States and international policies which promote the rights and inclusion of persons with disabilities worldwide. Accordingly, the undersigned task forces of the CCD have an especially strong interest in the issues presented by this case, including ensuring the exacting implementation of federal employment policy that maximizes the employment opportunities for Americans with disabilities.

We urge the Commission to uphold certification of the proposed class in this case. The State Department’s worldwide availability policy negatively affects hundreds of employees and job applicants, and needlessly deprives the country of the tremendous public service that could be provided by these outstanding job candidates. In urging this case go forward as a class action, we simply seek to advance the EEOC’s rallying cry that “[t]he Federal Government shall be a model employer of individuals with disability.” 29 CFR 1614.203(a).

Class complaint processing is appropriate because this case meets all of the criteria set forth by the Commission in 29 CFR 1614.204. In addition, this case focuses on a “broad pattern of workplace discrimination,” which is exactly the type of case that the Commission targeted when adopting its current regulations for class complaint processing. As the Commission confirmed in 1999: “[c]lass actions play a particularly vital role in the enforcement of the equal employment laws. They are an essential mechanism for attacking broad patterns of workplace discrimination and providing relief to victims of discriminatory policies or systematic practices.” 64 Fed. Reg. 37651 (1999).

The time has come to stop handling these challenges to a discriminatory policy piecemeal – and to address head-on the whole “worldwide availability requirement” as implemented.

Respectfully submitted,

CCD Rights Task Force Co-Chairs:

Mark Richert
American Foundation for the Blind

Curt Decker
National Disability Rights Network

CCD Employment and Training Task Force Co-Chairs:

Cheryl Bates-Harris
National Disability Rights Network

Alicia Epstein
NISH

Susan Goodman
Down Syndrome Congress

Charlie Harles
Inter-National Association of
Business, Industry & Rehabilitation

Susan Prokop
Paralyzed Veterans of America

Paul Seifert
Council of State Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation

CCD International Task Force Co-Chairs:

David Hutt
National Disability Rights Network

Deb Ziegler
Council for Exceptional Children

cc: Kimberly A. Jackson, Agency Representative
Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State
Email: Jacksona2@state.gov

Bryan J. Schwartz
Bryan Schwartz Law
Attorneys for Class Agent and the Class
Email: Bryan@BryanSchwartzLaw.com

Joseph V. Kaplan
Passman & Kaplan, PC
Co-counsel
Email: jkaplan@passmanandkaplan.com