Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Comcast v. Behrend: Supreme Court Conservative Majority Reaches to Strike Down Class Action, with Holdings of Limited Weight

by Bryan J. Schwartz and Michael D. Thomas

This morning, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Comcast v. Behrend. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, regarding which the justices split along ideological lines, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority held that the plaintiffs’ class action was improperly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3).

The practical impact of the Court’s ruling should be limited to antitrust cases and the particular facts of the case, according to the dissent. Written by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, the dissent states, “[t]he court’s ruling is good for this day and this case only.” Slip Op., dissent at 5. In particular, the dissent points out that the seemingly sweeping language of the majority requiring that “damages attributable to a classwide injury be measurable ‘on a class-wide basis’” (Slip Op., dissent at p. 3) could not be read as a general holding, since: "the need to prove damages on a classwide basis through a common methodology was never challenged" by the plaintiffs in the case (Slip Op., dissent at p. 5), rendering the majority’s discussions of such to be nothing more than dicta; and "it remains the 'black letter rule' that a class may obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to class members." Id.

It is a mystery why the Court granted certiorari in the first place or issued any decision ultimately. In particular, the Supreme Court granted review to decide "[w]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence..." (Slip Op., dissent at p. 1), though such did not resemble the petitioner's question presented for review. Then, the justices learned that Comcast had failed in the lower court to raise any evidentiary objections, such that the question of admissible evidence was not properly before the Supreme Court. The majority ultimately decided a totally different question (namely, whether the case was susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis) without briefing by the parties on the issue. Id. at 2.

By way of background, the named plaintiffs in the Comcast antitrust class action claimed that they and other subscribers in the Philadelphia “cluster” were harmed because Comcast’s tactics lessen competition and lead to overpriced services. They sought class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”

Plaintiffs originally alleged four types of antitrust impact. The District Court ruled that the plaintiffs could proceed on only one of those theories of liability, called “overbuilding,” regarding how smaller entrants into the market were inhibited based upon Comcast’s anti-competitive behaviors, leading to higher prices. Plaintiffs’ expert prepared a damages model that did not distinguish among the four different types of antitrust impacts, but simply measured the overall effect of Comcast’s practices (an $875M damages estimate from overpriced services). Slip Op., majority at p. 4.The District Court and Third Circuit concluded that it was inappropriate to consider the merits at the Rule 23 stage, but certification was appropriate, because a method of determining class-wide damages existed, meeting the predominance standard.

Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that at the class certification stage (as at trial), any model supporting a plaintiff's damages case must be consistent with the liability case theory, in order to be given weight by the courts. Slip Op., majority at p. 7. See also Slip Op., majority at p. 11 (“’The first step in a damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event.”). The majority emphasized that consideration of the merits is permissible where it overlaps with the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry. The Court therefore held that because the plaintiffs’ damages model was not specific as to which of the four theories of antitrust liability it relied upon, and because three of the theories had been rejected, plaintiffs’ proposed damages model could not show damages on a class-wide basis. Therefore, the majority found, the class should not have been certified.

The scathing dissent begins: “Today the Court reaches out to decide a case hardly fit for our consideration. On both procedural and substantive grounds, we dissent. This case comes to the Court infected by our misguided reformulation of the question presented. For that reason alone, we would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.” Slip Op., dissent at p. 1.

In addition to the points discussed above, the dissent notes that the Supreme Court’s majority inappropriately fails to defer to the trial court’s factual findings, namely, that striking three of the theories of antitrust liability did not impeach the plaintiffs’ expert’s damages model. Slip Op., dissent at p. 9. Ultimately, the only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn as to why the majority insisted on deciding this case is that the conservative Court is willing to go to great lengths, including considering a case where the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted, in order to deny class certification.

The Comcast v. Behrend case should not change plaintiffs’ arguments, and courts’ analysis, that “when adjudication of questions of liability common to the class will achieve economies of time and expense, the predominance standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate.” Slip Op., dissent at p. 4.

If you have questions about class action employment litigation, contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.

Bryan Schwartz Discusses Standard Fire v. Knowles Decision

The Lawyers USA news service relied upon several viewpoints expressed by Bryan Schwartz Law's principal in its discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Standard Fire v. Knowles decision.

The article is reprinted here.

Bryan Schwartz also expressed the view, not captured in the article, that the impact of the particular decision will be very limited, since few plaintiffs' lawyers use the device of a stipulation to a less-than-$5M claim to avoid federal court jurisdiction, raising the query as to why the Supreme Court felt the need to address the question. Schwartz conveyed, however, that some inherent contradictions arise with the defense bar's view (embraced by the Supreme Court) that fathoms expansive class actions for the purpose of seeking federal court jurisdiction, but then seeks to break a class into smithereens by using the notion of an arbitration class waiver, as articulated in ATT Mobility v. Concepcion.

Thursday, March 21, 2013

Supreme Court's Standard Fire Insurance Decision Eliminates Plaintiffs’ Ability to Avoid CAFA Jurisdiction through Pre-Certification Stipulations Limiting Amount in Controversy

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court published a unanimous decision in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450 (Mar. 19, 2013), authored by Justice Breyer, holding that a pre-certification putative class representative may not avoid federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) by stipulating that the amount in controversy is less than CAFA’s $5 million floor. The Court’s reasoning rested on the premise that a pre-certification class representative cannot bind potential members of the yet-to-be-certified class, and therefore cannot enter into a “stipulation” on their behalf.

The case, brought in Arkansas state court, involved a proposed class action alleging that the defendant insurer had unlawfully failed to include a general contractor fee when making certain homeowner’s insurance loss payments. Named plaintiff Knowles sought to certify “hundreds, and possibly thousands” of similarly harmed policyholders. The complaint stated that “Plaintiff and Class stipulate they will seek to recover total aggregate damages of less than five million dollars,” and an attached affidavit by Knowles stipulated that he would “not at any time during this case … seek damages for the class … in excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate.”

The defendant removed, but the district court remanded, holding that although the amount in controversy would have slightly exceeded the $5 million threshold, the stipulation deprived the federal court of jurisdiction under CAFA. Although the Eighth Circuit declined to hear an appeal from the remand order, the Supreme Court reached to take the case, evidencing a continued interest in defining the scope of plaintiffs’ class action remedies.

By holding that plaintiffs may not enter into pre-certification stipulations to limit the amount-in-controversy, the Court eliminated an arrow from plaintiffs’ quiver, making it more difficult to ensure that class claims are litigated in the class’s forum of choice. The Court was unswayed by the fact that plaintiffs proceeding on a non-class basis are free to stipulate that their damages will not exceed a specified amount-in-controversy.

As a result of the ruling, some class actions that would otherwise have proceeded in state court will presumably be forced into federal court. Plaintiffs may thus be deprived of more lenient state certification requirements and forced to proceed under Federal Rule 23, as interpreted by Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. __ (2011). Other “procedural” advantages of proceeding in state court, such as the availability of non-unanimous jury verdicts, will also become unavailable to such classes. And in some states, the federal bench tends to view class claims less favorably than the state. The Court’s ruling suggests an interest in reaching out to circumscribe the options of plaintiff classes. Nonetheless, in the Northern District of California, where Bryan Schwartz Law is located and frequently practices, the excellent federal bench may mitigate any damage that may be done by Standard Fire in other jurisdictions.

If you have questions about your class action rights, contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.

Disclaimer: Nothing in the foregoing commentary is intended to provide legal advice in any particular case. The author and Bryan Schwartz Law cannot represent you unless you have a signed representation agreement with the firm.

Friday, February 8, 2013

California Supreme Court Decides in Harris v. City of Santa Monica: Employer Does Not Escape Liability in Mixed Motive Cases

Yesterday, Justice Goodwin Liu, writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court, held that where unlawful discrimination is a substantial motivating factor in an adverse employment action, even if the employer also has a non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, the “employer does not escape liability.” Harris v. City of Santa Monica, S181004.

Within eight days of notifying her employer that she was pregnant, Ms. Harris was terminated from her position as a bus driver. Thereafter, she sued the City of Santa Monica for pregnancy discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). The City of Santa Monica claimed that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Ms. Harris also – namely, performance and attendance issues.

The jury was instructed to find for Ms. Harris if they determined that her pregnancy was a “motivating factor” in the City’s decision to terminate her. The jury found in favor of Ms. Harris and awarded her $177,905. The City of Santa Monica appealed the decision, based on, among other things, the trial court’s refusal to give the jury a mixed-motive instruction (BAJI No. 12.26).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the City of Santa Monica and determined that the refusal to give the “same-decision” instruction was prejudicial error. However, the Court of Appeal also recognized that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that Ms. Harris’ pregnancy was a motivating factor in the City’s decision to fire Ms. Harris. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and Ms. Harris petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The City asked the Supreme Court to adopt a standard of complete immunity for an employer that can show it would have made the same employment decision absent discrimination, relying upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) 490 U.S. 288.

In Price Waterhouse, the United States Supreme Court held that once a plaintiff shows that discrimination is a motivating factor in the employment decision, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. Price Waterhouse created  a “same-decision” defense, providing a defendant complete immunity to liability if the employer were to prove that it would have made the same employment decision, even in the absence of, in Ms. Harris’ case, her pregnancy. However, as the Harris court noted, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991 negated the complete defense established in Price Waterhouse, codifying instead the rule that an employer’s showing it would have made the same decision absent discrimination limits the remedies available to a Title VII plaintiff, but does not provide a complete defense to liability.

Ultimately, the California Supreme Court returned for its answer to the language and purpose of FEHA, prohibiting discrimination “because of” pregnancy or other protected bases (Gov. Code §12940), and hoping to effect “what the Legislature said it sought to accomplish in enacting the FEHA.” In so doing, the Supreme Court stressed FEHA’s “goal of preventing and deterring unlawful discrimination” in rejecting the employer’s notion of a complete defense to a FEHA action where they prove a “same-decision” defense. Yet, the Supreme Court declined the employee’s request to impose a “clear and convincing” standard for proof of the “same-decision” defense – allowing employers to escape liability for backpay and other relief based upon a simple preponderance of the evidence that they would have acted the same without discrimination.

Summarizing, the Supreme Court concluded that “when a jury finds that unlawful discrimination was a substantial factor motivating a termination of employment, and when the employer proves it would have made the same decision absent such discrimination, a court may not award damages, backpay, or an order of reinstatement.” Yet, the Court held that a prevailing plaintiff may still be entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief as well as attorney’s fees and costs, preventing a discriminating employer from escaping liability all together.

If you believe you have been subject to discrimination in your employment, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Disclaimer: Nothing in the foregoing commentary is intended to provide legal advice in a specific case or to form an attorney-client relationship with any reader. You must have a representation agreement signed with Bryan Schwartz Law to be a client of this firm or this author.

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

Daily Journal Cover Story Regarding Class Arbitration Features Bryan Schwartz Law Principal

The following article picked up on the Bryan Schwartz Law blog article of December 26, 2012.


Employment disputes go to class arbitration, for now

The Daily Journal, January 11, 2013
By Laura Hautala, Daily Journal Staff Writer

Link to this article, featuring Bryan Schwartz, Principal of Bryan Schwartz Law, here:

When a company faces class action claims from employees, it normally won't hesitate in trying to enforce an arbitration agreement. But some employers who win the fight to arbitrate might be jumping out of the proverbial frying pan into the deep-fat fryer: class arbitration. It happened to VMware Inc., a technology company in Palo Alto that successfully compelled arbitration in an employment dispute with a worker who filed class claims. The company's agreement did not specifically ban class arbitration, so the arbitrator decided to consider certifying a class and hearing the claims together, according to court filings. Bryan J. Schwartz, a sole practitioner in Oakland who represents the plaintiff, said class arbitration is "a fairly brutal proposition for employers," pointing to the high cost and slow speed of the mass proceedings.

"They've got to be careful what they ask for," Schwartz said. VMware asked the judge who initially awarded arbitration to strike the arbitrator's decision, but the judge said in December it was not within his powers to do so. Laughlin v. VMware Inc., CV11-530 (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 2011).

Though it's not clear how often arbitrators decide to hear these cases as class proceedings, parties currently have to guess what an arbitrator is likely to decide.

The uncertainty comes from a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision, which said arbitrators cannot construe contracts that are silent on the matter of class arbitration to tacitly allow the proceedings. While defense lawyers hoped that would prevent arbitrators from hearing class claims in many cases, the decision left some questions open, according to Paul Hastings LLP partner Paul W. Cane Jr. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et al. v. Animalfeeds International Corp., 130 US 1758 (2010).

"Some courts and arbitrators have taken silent agreements and reasoned through a variety of gymnastic exercises that the silent agreement really wasn't silent after all," Cane said. For example, an arbitrator might interpret an agreement that states "any and all types of disputes" must be settled in arbitration to include class claims, he said.

The high court accepted another case for review in the current session that attorneys on both sides expect to settle whether arbitrators can make this decision for parties "based solely on their use of broad contractual language." Oxford Health Plans LLC v. John Ivan Sutter, 11-1773.

For now, parties to some employment disputes might continue finding themselves in class arbitration, where the pressure to settle intensifies. And the downsides for employers can go beyond the cost - fees of roughly $700 per hour - to procedural drawbacks. For one, arbitration doesn't create a record that parties can later appeal. Often, companies are willing to take this risk for the speedy resolution promised by individual arbitration, Cane said, but the stakes are too high in a class arbitration.

Many plaintiffs' attorneys say the lack of a record hurts their clients more than it does the defense in an individual proceeding. But for employers in a class arbitration, "the shoe is on the other foot," said Victoria W. Ni, a senior attorney at Public Justice PC in Oakland.

What's more, the resolution might no longer be as quick as it is in individual proceedings.

"Class actions in courts move slowly," Cane said. "Class actions in arbitration move like glaciers."

Winston & Strawn LLP partner Joan B. Tucker Fife said class arbitration can still provide advantages for employers.

"You pretty much know who your judge is going to be, and you can anticipate what that looks like," Fife said. "I could certainly envision a circumstance where the employer is more comfortable with a selected arbitrator than they were with the judge that was selected for the case." She also said that a company might prefer class arbitration because it reduces publicity around the case, preventing other employees from filing "copycat" cases.

But, as in the VMware case, the prospect of class arbitration can give an employer "buyer's remorse" after compelling arbitration. Fife said that's an outcome attorneys should be prepared for. A case alleging violations of the California labor code against American Life and Accident Insurance Co. went to arbitration, but the arbitrator decided to continue the case for the group of all affected employees. The defendants asked the judge to reverse the decision, but just as in the VMware case, the judge left it up to the arbitrator. Banford v. American Life and Accident Insurance Co., DS1017566 (San Bernardino Co. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 30, 2010).

"The lawyers should be advising the clients of the risk of demanding arbitration," Fife said.

Wednesday, December 26, 2012

Employers: Be Careful What You Wish For - Your Motion to Compel Arbitration Can Lead to Expensive, Class-Wide Arbitration

In the wake of ATT Mobility v. Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds,* many employers have sought to enact new arbitration agreements or to enforce arbitration provisions in older agreements to eliminate their employees' ability to come together when seeking to vindicate their rights to enforce statutory protections for workers. Employers should be careful what they wish for, in seeking to compel arbitration. They may indeed wind up in arbitration - but unable to strike class allegations, and required to pay the full and exhorbitant costs of class-wide arbitration.

In a case on which Bryan Schwartz Law serves as local counsel for Richard J. Burch of Bruckner Burch, in Houston, Texas, the employer is now feeling the danger of a Stolt-Nielsen-based strategy seeking to compel individual arbitration in a putative, wage-hour class action. In the Laughlin v. VMWare case, in which VMWare employees assert they were misclassified as exempt employees and denied overtime and other compensation to which they were entitled, the company moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement which did not specifically provide for class-wide arbitration.

Judge Edward Davila of the Northern District of California struck some of the more offensive provisions of the arbitration agreement under Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, such as a provision which would have required Plaintiff to share the costs of arbitration. However, Judge Davila found these unlawful provisions severable (i.e., refused to kill the whole arbitration agreement). Perhaps most importantly, though, Judge Davila referred to the arbitrator the decision on the Stolt-Nielsen argument - namely, as argued by VMWare, the notion that class-wide arbitration cannot proceed where the parties' arbitration agreement did not expressly consent to class arbitration. His initial decision from early 2012 is available here:

In arbitration, AAA arbitrator LaMothe then rejected the employer’s Stolt-Nielsen motion to strike class allegations, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement did not expressly give permission to bring class allegations, finding the parties' agreement intended to encompass all claims by Plaintiff Laughlin, including her class claims. The AAA order is available here:

In the last 18 months, numerous other arbitrators from JAMS, AAA, and other nationwide arbitration services have likewise denied motions to strike class allegations, employing similar reasoning.

On review, Judge Davila confirmed the arbitrator's partial final clause construction award allowing class allegations to proceed, meaning - in light of all the foregoing - that VMWare will now be forced to arbitrate a putative class action, and will be forced to bear all of the costs of doing so, shown here.

Be careful what you wish for, employers. You may find that sometimes, allowing employees their day in court is better than the alternative.

If you are an employee and have questions about an arbitration agreement you signed, which might affect your right to proceed with class action claims, or other rights, contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.

DISCLAIMER: Nothing in this article is intended to form an attorney-client relationship with the reader. You must have a signed representation agreement with the firm to be a client.

*See our numerous prior blog posts relating to the subject of arbitration class waivers in light of Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen, including:

http://bryanschwartzlaw.blogspot.com/2012/09/california-supreme-court-grants-review.html

http://bryanschwartzlaw.blogspot.com/2012/09/wage-and-hour-class-actions-sky-is.html

http://bryanschwartzlaw.blogspot.com/2012/01/landmark-decision-by-national-labor.html

http://bryanschwartzlaw.blogspot.com/2011/05/civil-rights-lawyer-and-employee.html

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

A Post-Brinker Victory for Employees: Bradley v. Networkers International, LLC

In the aftermath of the California Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 (Brinker), employers and non-exempt employees are still hashing out the implications of the clarified meal and rest period requirements.  In April, Bryan Schwartz Law discussed the implications of that case on this blog, which can be found here: California Supreme Court's Long-Awaited Brinker Decision.

Last week, in Bradley v. Networkers International, LLC (December 12, 2012)  ---Cal. Rptr.3d ---, 2012 WL 6182473, the California Court of Appeal in San Diego addressed a common problem in meal and rest period cases: where an employer has no compliant meal and rest period policies that are distributed to employees. This case makes clear that a lack of a meal or rest period policy can provide sufficient commonality for class certification, which is a significant victory for plaintiffs.

Background
While the Brinker case was pending, a number of cases appealed to the Supreme Court were granted review and held, pending the decision in Brinker.  Among the cases relegated to judicial limbo was Bradley v. Networkers International, Inc. (Feb. 5, 2009, D052365). In Bradley, three plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Networkers International, LLC, alleging violations of California’s wage and hour laws including nonpayment of overtime and failure to provide rest breaks and meal periods. The plaintiffs moved to certify the class, which requires that they “demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1021. The court determined that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that common factual and legal questions would predominate over the individual issues and denied class certification. The plaintiffs appealed, but the decision was upheld by the California Court of Appeal.

Plaintiffs appealed to the California Supreme Court, which granted petition for review but held the case for over three years until Brinker was resolved. After issuing their decision in Brinker, the California Supreme Court remanded Bradley to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, with directions to vacate its decision on class certification and reconsider the case in light of the Brinker decision.

Before getting to the recent decision from the Fourth Appellate District, a little background is useful. A common fight between employers and employees arises when an employer classifies its employees as “independent contractors,” as opposed to employees. True independent contractors have control over the terms and conditions of their employment and are not subject to California wage and hour protections including overtime and meal and rest periods. Employees, on the other hand, remain under their employer’s control during their working hours and are protected by California’s wage and hour laws. The employee versus independent contractor issue has been a battleground for years in the employment law arena and California courts have developed numerous criteria to assess whether an individual is truly an independent contractor or an employee.

In the recent Bradley case, the three plaintiffs alleged that they were misclassified as independent contractors, and should instead have been treated as employees. All three of the plaintiffs worked for Networkers. Each of the plaintiffs was required to sign an “independent contractor agreement,” which stated that each was an independent contractor rather than an employee. As such, plaintiffs did not receive overtime pay or meal or rest periods. However, contrary to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiffs alleged that they were treated as employees and were subject to the same employment policies.

Networkers argued that plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class should be denied because the case did not involve common questions of fact or law, and therefore, resolution of the case would require mini-trials for each plaintiff. Although the court agreed with Networkers on the first go-around, after the Brinker decision, the court agreed with plaintiffs on all but one cause of action.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision on Remand
Because Networkers applied consistent companywide policies applicable to all employees regarding scheduling, payments, and work requirements, those policies could be analyzed on a class-wide basis. The court would not need to assess them with respect to each potential class member. In analyzing whether class certification was appropriate the court noted that, “[t]he critical fact is that the evidence likely to be relied upon by the parties would be largely uniform throughout the class.” The court held that the factual and legal issues related to the independent contractor issue would be the same among the plaintiff class members, and therefore appropriate for class treatment.

Moreover, in Bradley, as in many workplaces, the employer did not have a policy actually distributed to employees that provides for meal and rest periods. Networkers argued that Brinker was not controlling, in its guidance about meal and rest requirements, because in Brinker the plaintiffs challenged an express meal and rest break policy whereas in Bradley, the plaintiffs were arguing that the employer’s lack of policy violated the law. The Court rejected this argument, holding: “This is not a material distinction on the record before us. Under Brinker, and under the facts here, the employer engaged in uniform companywide conduct that allegedly violated state law.” Bradley, 2012 WL 6182473 *13. The Court noted that plaintiffs had presented evidence on Networkers’ uniform practice and that Networkers acknowledged that it did not have a policy and did not know if employees took meal or rest breaks. In assessing the lack of evidence presented by Networkers and relying on Brinker, the Bradley Court held: “Here, plaintiffs’ theory of recovery is based on Networkers’ (uniform)  lack of a rest and meal break policy and its (uniform) failure to authorize employees to take statutorily required rest and meal breaks. The lack of a meal/rest break policy and the uniform failure to authorize such breaks are matters of common proof.” Bradley, 2012 WL 6182473 *13.

The Bradley decision disposes of a significant hurdle in wage and hour cases by holding that this type of scheme – where no policy is distributed to provide for meal and rest periods- can meet the commonality requirement for class certification. For example, Bryan Schwartz Law is currently representing a group of restaurant workers who were not aware of a meal/rest period policy, and who were not provided with meal or rest periods. In the Bryan Schwartz Law case, there was no policy that provided the workers with coverage to enable them to take their breaks. Under Bradley, certification is appropriate to test, class-wide, whether the employer’s lack of a well-defined policy or practice of providing meal/rest periods violated the Labor Code.

Although several meal and rest period cases have been decided adversely to workers post-Brinker, the Bradley court determined that each of those cases was distinguishable.  In distinguishing Lamps Plus Overtime Cases (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 35, the Bradley Court of Appeal noted that it was undisputed that the Lamps Plus employer’s written meal and rest period policy was consistent with state law requirements and that the violations differed at each store and with respect to each employee. Similarly, the Bradley court held that Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1487 was distinguishable because the only evidence of a company-wide policy or practice was Chipotle’s evidence that it provided meal and rest breaks as required by law. Likewise, Bradley distinguished Tien v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1077, noting that in that case there was “overwhelming” evidence that meal periods were made available and the employer’s liability with respect to each employee depended on issues specific to each employee. Brookler v. Radioshack Corp. is an undecided case that was remanded after Brinker involving wage and hour class certification, which may provide additional clarification on these issues.

The court also rejected Networkers’ argument that because each plaintiff would be owed a different amount of damages, the case should not be certified. Relying, in part, on the concurring opinion in Brinker, the court held that even where plaintiffs are required to individually prove damages, individualized damages inquiries do not bar class certification. The court also reversed its prior decision and determined that class certification on the issue of overtime was appropriate because, assuming the plaintiffs were employees, proof of damages could be determined from the common proof of the pay records.

Although the court decided to remand the off-the-clock work issue, it did so because the factual record did not show that there was a uniform policy requiring each employee to work off the clock.

If you believe you have been misclassified as an independent contractor, have meal and rest period claims, or have questions about other wage and hour violations, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Disclaimer: Nothing in the foregoing commentary is intended to provide legal advice in a specific case or to form an attorney-client relationship with any reader. You must have a representation agreement with Bryan Schwartz Law to be a client of this firm or author.