Showing posts with label Wage and Hour. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wage and Hour. Show all posts

Thursday, August 12, 2021

Rescission of Trump-Era Joint Employer Rule Strengthens Workers’ Rights










The federal government is scrapping a rule created under the Trump administration to narrow the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for workers with more than one employer. Because this Trump administration rule shrank the category of entities liable for wage violations, it made recovering earned wages more difficult for employees. Its implementation would have cost employees one billion dollars per year, according to the Economic Policy Institute. A federal court struck down a large portion of the rule last year in New York v. Scalia; now, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) has decided to rescind the rule entirely. The rescission will take effect on September 28, 2021. 

When multiple entities are considered joint employers, they can be held accountable for the same employee’s wages and other rights and benefits. For example, some workers hired through staffing agencies are jointly employed by the agency and the business at which they perform their duties. In such a case, both the agency and the other business is legally responsible for ensuring that the worker is appropriately compensated. The Trump-era “Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act”' redefined the criteria for the joint employer classification, to make fewer employers liable. 


The rule broke from past DOL interpretations of the FLSA, as B
ryan Schwartz Law previously
wrote. It did away with the traditional “economic dependence” analysis in favor of an employer-favorable four-factor analysis of the entity’s control over the employee. These Trump administration-preferred factors were whether an entity

(i)                Hires or fires the employee;

(ii)              Supervises and controls the employee's work schedule or conditions of employment to a substantial degree;

(iii)           Determines the employee's rate and method of payment; or

(iv)            Maintains the employee's employment records.


The court in New York v. Scalia threw out most of this rule, siding with the seventeen states and the District of Columbia that challenged it. However, the court’s decision applied only to “vertical” joint employment—when an employee obtains work with an entity through a contractor, such as a staffing agency, and in similar situations. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s rule continued to govern “horizontal” joint employer liability, which can apply when a worker splits time between two employers. 


The Biden administration’s DOL will eliminate the Trump DOL’s rule in its entirety, providing a clear set of uniform regulations. This rescission fuels advocates’ hopes that the Biden Administration will continue to reverse regressive Trump-era policies undermining workers’ rights. Bryan Schwartz Law has written about previous reversals. For instance, in May, the Biden Department of Labor prevented the Trump administration’s Independent Contractor Rule from going into effect. That rule would have made it easier for employers to misclassify workers as independent contractors, denying them the rights of employees under the FLSA. Biden also revoked a memo issued by Trump’s Justice Department attempting to limit the protections that the landmark decision Bostock v. Clayton County affords LGBTQ+ workers. 


If you have been denied wages, breaks, overtime pay, or any other workers’ rights, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Thursday, July 29, 2021

Employees Win Victory in California Supreme Court Ruling on Meal and Rest Break Compensation










California law provides non-exempt employees with meal and rest periods. If an employer does not provide compliant meal or rest periods, employees are entitled to “one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation.” (
Cal. Lab. Code Section 226.7(c).) But are forms of pay such as incentives or commissions included in this calculus, or is it limited to hourly pay? In a victory for employees, the California Supreme Court decided earlier this month that other non-discretionary pay must be included in calculating an employee’s regular rate.


The case was filed by Jessica Ferra, a former bartender at the Loews Hollywood Hotel. Ferra claimed Loews had underpaid her and a class of similarly-situated employees for non-compliant meal and rest breaks because she and the other class members’ incentive payments were excluded from the calculation of missed breaks premiums. These payments were part of the pay Ferra expected and Loews promised, so Ferra contended that they should be factored into the formula for the “regular rate of compensation” used to calculate missed break premiums. In Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) No. S259172 , the California Supreme Court agreed. 

 

“Regular rate of compensation” versus “regular rate of pay”


The decision came down to whether the “regular rate of compensation” for meal and rest break premiums is calculated the same way as is the “regular rate of pay” for overtime purposes. Loews contended that the calculations were different because the legal phrases were different, arguing that when the legislature uses different terms, it intends their meaning to differ. The court was not persuaded, noting that “compensation” and “pay” are synonyms. Regardless, the key phrase was “regular rate,” which applies to the calculations for both overtime and meal and rest break premiums. The court reasoned that the “regular rate” calculation follows that of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), looking to California case law and legislative history. Therefore, the “regular rate of pay” under California law must follow the same method of calculation as the “regular rate” in the FLSA, both for overtime calculations and for meal and rest break premium calculations. The court further opined that even if “compensation” and “pay” had different meanings in a relevant way, compensation covers a broader range of employment benefits than pay, such as wages, commissions, medical benefits, and other benefits.


Retroactive application


Sweetening the victory for employees, the Court determined that its decision applies retroactively to violations that came before the July 15 decision. The Court reasoned that its ruling rested on statutory interpretation, which merely clarifies a statute’s meaning, rather than setting forth new law. The Court rejected Loews’s misguided argument that this decision would put employers on the hook for millions of dollars, pointing out that “it is not clear why we should favor the interest of employers in avoiding ‘millions’ in liability over the interest of employees in obtaining the ‘millions’ owed to them under the law.” Consequently, employees may have a legal claim for non-compliant meal and rest break premiums, even if they were denied compensation before Ferra was decided.  


If you believe you have been wrongly denied meal or rest breaks or premiums paid at the correct rate of pay, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law here.



Monday, June 29, 2020

Hope for Workers’ Wage Claims for Commute Time

Earlier this month, the California Court of Appeal found that workers may be entitled to pay and reimbursements for time commuting to and from their workplaces. Typically, time commuting is not compensable, but, time commuting that also is in service of the employer or under the employer’s control might be another story.

 

In the class action at issue, Oliver v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc. (CA6 H045069 6/2/20), the California Sixth District Court of Appeal found that triable issues of material fact existed as to whether service technicians can be paid and reimbursed for commuting to and from their non-office locations of the day. The court reversed summary adjudication in favor of the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 



The technicians sought wages for time spent commuting to and from the first and last work location and reimbursement for the mileage accrued during such commutes. The technicians rarely drove to an actual branch location for work—instead, they usually began their days by driving from home to the first customer location of the day and ended their days by driving from the last customer location home. The Court held that the key to deciding if the technicians were entitled to be paid for commute time was whether the technicians were “required during the commute to carry a volume of tools and parts” that restricted them from using their time effectively for their own purposes. The technicians drove their personal vehicles containing their employer’s tools and parts to customer sites to make repairs to copiers and other machines. Such tools and parts included a laptop, small vacuum cleaner, a hand cart, a service case containing hand tools, and around 150-250 expensive replacement parts for machines. Although the technicians were not required to carry their employer’s tools at all times and could use “field stocking locations” to store parts between service locations, most technicians carried smaller tools and parts in their cars as “field stocking locations” were either inconvenient or unavailable. Technicians were also required to have at least 25 cubic feet of lockable cargo space in their cars for the tools, which, according to the employer’s “Field Parts Inventory Practice Guide,” should have been “easy to locate” and were subject to random audits. 

 

The trial court found for the defendants, determining that the commute time was not compensable as “hours worked” under Industrial Wage Commission Order No. 4-2001, which defines hours worked as the time which an employee is subject to control of an employer. The trial court also found that the service technicians were not entitled to reimbursement for the mileage under Labor Code § 2802. Labor Code § 2802 requires an employer to reimburse its employees for all duty-related expenses. 

 

The Court of Appeal, relying on Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., found otherwise. See 22 Cal. 4th 575 (2000). In Morillion, the California Supreme Court found that commute time to and from work is generally not compensable, but “compulsory travel time” is required to be compensated. Id. at 587. Under this analysis, the “level of the employer’s control over its employees . . . is determinative.” Id. In other words, if an employee cannot use their commute “time effectively for [their] own purposes,” such as dropping off their children to school or stopping for breakfast before work, the employee is subject to their employer’s control. Id. at 586. Therefore, in this case, if the service technicians were required to carry their employer’s tools and were not able to use their commute time “effectively for [their] own purposes,” then the technicians were subject to the control of their employer and Konica Minolta would have to pay the technicians for their commute-time wages and mileage reimbursement. The Court of Appeal found that this analysis involved two factual disputes that needed to be determined at the trial court: (1) whether service technicians were required to commute with tools and parts in their personal vehicles, and (2) the volume of tools and parts service technicians were required to carry in their vehicles while commuting.

 

The level of control an employer has over its employees is often determinative in wage cases. As Bryan Schwartz Law as written about before here, the Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles held that workers in California are presumptively employees of those for whom they labor. See 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018). Among other factors, they must be free from the control and direction of the hiring entity to be considered an independent contractor in wage and hour cases.

 

With commute times in California being some of the worst in the nation, being properly compensated for time commuting that is under the control and in the service of the employer would make a big difference in workers’ paychecks.

 

Bryan Schwartz Law has written about compensation for commute times and wage and hour issues before. If you believe you are owed wages, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.

Friday, January 10, 2020

CoreLogic Sanctioned Over $86,000 For Violating Court Orders Compelling Arbitration



This week, a federal court in Orange County issued an order requiring CoreLogic, a real estate appraisal company, to pay over $86,000 in sanctions for “willfully and unreasonably disobey[ing]” court orders regarding arbitration.

Bryan Schwartz Law, along with co-counsel Nichols Kaster, LLP, filed a class and collective action case against CoreLogic at the end of 2017. The plaintiffs in Mitchell v. CoreLogic, Inc. et al., Case No. 8:17-cv-02274-DOC-DFM (C.D.Cal.) – real estate appraisers for defendant CoreLogic – alleged a variety of violations of state and federal wage and hours laws, including failure to pay overtime, failure to provide adequate meal and rest breaks, and failure to pay premiums for missed breaks.

In February 2019, CoreLogic successfully moved to compel many of the plaintiffs to arbitration, but then balked when approximately 160 of the plaintiffs filed arbitrations and CoreLogic was suddenly faced with the accompanying bills. CoreLogic twice sought relief from U.S. District Court Judge David O. Carter, and twice the judge denied its request.

In its first effort to avoid the very arbitration it moved to compel, CoreLogic raised a variety of administrative issues, which the court rejected. In his order on May 28, 2019, Judge Carter stated:

 “CoreLogic moved this Court to order Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. As CoreLogic previously argued, issues of arbitrability or the implication of statutes of limitation must be resolved by the arbitrator . . . CoreLogic asked for resolution of any and all disputes by the arbitrator. Having compelled arbitration, the Court will not now stay those proceedings due to associated costs.”

Undeterred, CoreLogic tried again to get out of the arbitrations by arguing that certain “threshold issues” had to be resolved before it proceeded with certain arbitrations. In a December 17, 2019 order, Judge Carter stated:

“The Court is very concerned about (and will no longer tolerate) more foot dragging on this issue. The Court ORDERS the parties to refile these cases with the [American Arbitration Association] and participate in the arbitration proceedings.”

In a follow up order on January 9, 2020, Judge Carter ordered CoreLogic to pay $18,482.49 in sanctions to Bryan Schwartz Law and $67,482.49 to Nichols Kaster for the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in complying with the court’s prior orders to arbitrate.

CoreLogic’s tactics are part of a growing trend of companies that, upon forcing arbitration, balk when they have to pay up. Thankfully, the court’s sanctions order here is also part of a growing trend of courts calling companies’ bluff.

The issue of arbitration is an evolving one in CA. Bryan Schwartz Law is committed to holding companies accountable when they force their employees to arbitrate rather than allow their employees to have their day in court. The sanctions order is yet another victory in holding corporate America accountable.

If you have been forced to arbitrate your claims but your employer is not cooperating, contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.

Wednesday, November 27, 2019

Giving Thanks for Worker Protections—California Supreme Court and California Legislature Limit Arbitration Agreements in Employment


The California Supreme Court handed down a decision earlier this year that adds to the growing body of law surrounding mandatory arbitration agreements and delivering a victory for employees. The case is Oto, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111. This decision, plus the California Legislature’s recent legislation in AB-51, limit the extent to which employers can attempt to force their employees into binding arbitration.

Employers increasingly require their employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements. By these agreements, employees waive their right to pursue employment actions against their employers by any means besides binding arbitration. The arbitration process often favors employers and effectively stymies employees’ efforts to vindicate their rights, protecting employers that wish to skirt the law. Employers’ reliance on mandatory arbitration has ballooned following the past decade of U.S. Supreme Court cases whittling away at employees’ right to vindicate their employment grievances in court or through an administrative proceeding. Given that mandatory arbitration agreements are so widespread, Bryan Schwartz Law has blogged about them many times, including here, here, here, here, and here.

One of the ways in which an employee may be able to escape from the requirements of a mandatory arbitration agreement is by arguing that the agreement itself is invalid, using the same legal arguments that could be made as to any contract. Oto v. Kho addressed one of these contract defenses in particular: the doctrine of unconscionability.

A contract might be unconscionable in one of two ways. First, the contract could be procedurally unconscionable. This means that the circumstances in which the contract was formed were so unfair that one of the parties could not have agreed to it based on their own free will.

Second, the contract could be substantively unconscionable. This means that the terms of the contract themselves are so unfair against one party that a court will refuse to enforce the contract.

Both were present in Oto v. Kho, the California Supreme Court ruled. The plaintiff in the case, Ken Kho, worked for One Toyota in Oakland, California, for three years before he was presented with several documents, including a mandatory arbitration agreement, by a low-level employee. Kho, whose first language is Chinese, was forced to sign the agreement immediately without a chance to review the agreement first. Later, Kho filed a complaint with the California Labor Commissioner against One Toyota for unpaid wages. One Toyota moved to compel arbitration on the eve of a hearing before the Labor Commissioner and refused to participate in the proceedings before the Labor Commissioner any further. The proceedings took place without One Toyota, and the Labor Commissioner entered an award for Kho.

The trial court vacated the award but did not compel arbitration. The court of appeal reversed, holding that, despite the apparent procedural unconscionability, the agreement was not substantively unconscionable.

The California Supreme Court disagreed. First, several aspects of the formation of the agreement smacked of procedural unconscionability. The agreement was presented to Kho at his workplace, along with other employment-related documents. No one explained the document or provided a copy in Kho’s native language, but he was required to sign it in order to keep his job. If Kho had insisted on taking the time to review the documents, his pay would have been reduced because he was paid on a piece-rate basis. The agreement was communicated to Kho by a low-level employee, indicating that One Toyota would not entertain any request for explanation. Furthermore, the low-level employee waited for Kho to review and execute the agreement, which created the impression that Kho was expected to do so immediately. One Toyota did not give Kho a copy of the executed agreement.

Moreover, the language of the agreement was rife with complex legalese and convoluted sentences. This dense paragraph was printed on tiny font; the court of appeal characterized it as “visually impenetrable.” The agreement’s deceptive nature was also apparent in how it characterized the responsibility for the costs of arbitration. The agreement set forth that the costs of arbitration would be split between the parties unless controlling case law provided otherwise, without noting that the controlling decision in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, created an exception to this default rule in employment cases. Taken together, these aspects of the agreement demonstrated that it “did not promote voluntary or informed agreement.”

Second, the agreement was substantively unconscionable. It provided no indication as to how one could bring an action in arbitration, as the agreement required. The process set forth in the mandatory arbitration agreement was as complex and intricate as the process for civil litigation, requiring arbitration to be initiated through the filing of a complaint and setting forth specific motions and discovery procedures. These procedures ran counter to the supposed benefits of arbitration—its purported speed and efficiency. The Court was also concerned that the arbitration agreement all but required claimants to hire legal counsel due to the complexity of its procedures, forcing employees to incur attorneys’ fees, whereas employees bringing wage claims have access to free legal assistance from the Labor Commissioner. Given that Kho’s mandatory arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, it was unenforceable.

The California Legislature also made a foray into mandatory arbitration provisions, amending the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) to protect employees against forced arbitration. The amendment, AB-51, makes it an unlawful employment action to require any current or prospective employee to waive the right to pursue their FEHA claims in court or any other forum—in other words, employers cannot require employees to sign mandatory arbitration provisions as a condition of employment. The new legislation, set to take effect on January 1, 2020, also includes a provision prohibiting employers from retaliating against any employee because of their refusal to agree to mandatory arbitration.

If you have an employment dispute against your current or former employer, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.



Tuesday, April 9, 2019

You Can’t Split This Baby—Employees Cannot be Forced to Arbitrate Parts of PAGA Claims, Appeals Court Rules

Arbitration agreements are more and more popular among employers (and the United States Supreme Court) as a way to get out of concerted actions brought by wronged employees. In California, they cannot be enforced to stop state prosecution of wage claims through qui tam representative plaintiffs under the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq. See Iskanian v. CLS Trans. Los Angeles, LLC (2004) 59 Cal.4th 348, 382-92.

Nevertheless, employers have sought ways to force PAGA actions out of court and into arbitration, arguing that PAGA claims for wages should go to arbitration, while only the statutory PAGA penalties could remain before a court. A handful of cases in the Courts of Appeal have dealt with this issue, one of which, Lawson v. ZB, N.A., (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 705, is pending before the California Supreme Court. Bryan Schwartz Law has submitted an amicus brief to the California Supreme Court in this case.


On March 28, 2019, a California appellate court issued another decision rejecting this argument, adding to the list of decisions protecting PAGA enforcement in this rapidly developing area of the law.  See Zakaryan v. The Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. (Mar. 28, 2019) __Cal.App.5th__. To understand why Zakaryan is noteworthy, we must understand the legislative intent behind PAGA. Before PAGA was enacted in 2003, California struggled to enforce the worker protections in the Labor Code. The financial crisis was in full effect, and the state government could not afford to oversee California’s massive workforce. So it decided to let employees enforce the Labor Code themselves, on behalf of the state, provided that first they comply with some straightforward procedures and the state decides not to take the case itself. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3. A PAGA action is “brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699. PAGA also provides for penalties to be assessed against liable employers. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(f). The state gets 75% of any PAGA award, while the employee gets 25% plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699(g)(1), (i).

Employers have tried to contract around PAGA using arbitration agreements. It hasn’t worked. Although arbitration agreements can waive employees’ class action rights (Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018)), employers cannot force the state to arbitrate its claims, which are vindicated through PAGA. Iskanian, 59 Cal.4th at 378-92. The suing representative plaintiff just stands in the state’s shoes. Id at 386-87. Because an employee cannot contractually waive a right belonging to the state, an arbitration agreement cannot waive an employee’s right to proceed under PAGA.

Despite this, The Men’s Wearhouse tried to argue that a PAGA claim for wages should go to arbitration. The California Court of Appeals didn’t buy it in Zakaryan (Mar. 28, 2019) __Cal.App.5th__.

Plaintiff Zakaryan worked for The Men’s Wearhouse as a store manager from 2002 until 2016, before suing under PAGA, alleging that the company wrongfully misclassified its store managers as exempt from California’s overtime and meal and rest break laws. The Men’s Wearhouse moved to send the portion of Mr. Zakaryan’s claims involving underpaid wages to arbitration. It lost, and appealed.

After a careful analysis of PAGA and arbitration law, the appellate court rejected The Men’s Wearhouse’s argument for two reasons. First, splitting the PAGA claim would violate California’s “primary rights theory,” under which “one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief.” A PAGA claim, the court ruled, involves “one and only one ‘particular injury’—namely the injury to the public that the ‘state labor law enforcement agencies’ were created to safeguard.” Therefore, a PAGA claim cannot be split between a court and arbitration.

Second, sending part of the case to arbitration would run contrary to labor and arbitration law. PAGA awards the state 75% and the aggrieved employee the remainder of “a single civil penalty,” the court observed, which could not be properly heeded if portions of the civil penalties were syphoned off to arbitration. Moreover, “a PAGA claim is, fundamentally, a representative claim,” in which the suing employee represents other aggrieved employees in a suit brought on behalf of the state. As such, there was no individual portion of the claim to break off in an arbitration proceeding. In addition, Mr. Zakaryan had elected to pursue claims under PAGA’s representative action mechanism rather than his individual claims. Forcing him to arbitrate as if he had brought individual claims would effectively hijack his case. Finally, splitting the PAGA action would send the most important aspect of the claim to be determined—the employer’s liability—to the arbitrator, thereby circumventing the state’s right to have its enforcement action heard in court.

The California Supreme Court will soon decide this issue in Lawson.

If you have California wage claims and your employer is trying to force you into arbitration, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.



Friday, March 1, 2019

On-Call Scheduling Practice Ruled a Violation of Employees’ Rights

On February 4, 2019, the Court of Appeals for California’s Second District ruled in favor of retail employees in an important decision about on-call work time in Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc., Case No. B280151. This decision is a major victory for on-call employees who have to set aside time for shifts they might not get to work. You can find the opinion here.

The employer, Tilly’s, a clothing and accessories retailer, required their employees to call two hours ahead of some shifts to find out if they were actually needed. These on-call shifts had concrete start and end times, and Tilly’s instructed its employees to plan as if they were definitely going to work the shifts. Some on-call shifts were scheduled immediately after an employee’s regular shift, in which case the employee would learn whether she was needed during her regular shift. Although Tilly’s could reprimand or even fire employees for failing to call in before their on-call shifts, they were not paid for any on-call shifts they did not work, nor were they paid for the two hours between calling in and the start of the on-call shift.

A scheduling scheme like Tilly’s puts workers, especially low-wage workers, in a tough spot. An employee scheduled for a potential shift has to plan her day as if she will work the shift, despite not having the guarantee of compensation. This stressful arrangement means setting up child care or care for aging relatives, pursuing additional employment, rearranging health care appointments and education schedules, or foregoing sleep, personal hygiene, or leisure, even though an employee may not know whether she will be called in to work until just two hours before her potential shift. In essence, Tilly’s required their employees to block out their time for work without the assurance of being paid.

The plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Tilly’s, challenging this scheduling practice. Tilly’s argued that the lawsuit did not state a cause of action—that everything the employee said Tilly’s did, in Tilly’s view, was legal. The Superior Court in Los Angeles agreed and threw out the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Tilly’s on-call scheduling scheme violated the law, specifically Wage Order 7 (Spanish) (Chinese). The Industrial Welfare Commission has issued 17 Wage Orders, including Wage Order 7, to regulate wages and work conditions for California workers. Wage Order 7 requires employers to pay employees for “[e]ach workday an employee is required to report for work, but is not put to work . . . .” Wage Order 7-2001 (8 Cal. Code Regs § 11070). Tilly’s argued that the phrase “report to work” requires an employee’s physical presence at the workplace when a shift starts.

Not so, said the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals drew attention to the unbalanced burdens that Tilly’s on-call scheduling scheme placed on its workers. The scheme benefited Tilly’s immensely: “This permits employers to keep their labors costs low when business is slow, while having workers at the ready when business picks up. It thus creates no incentive for employers to competently anticipate their labor needs and to schedule accordingly.” Ward, Case No. B280151, at *22. In contrast, the scheme “impose[d] tremendous costs on employees. . . . [O]n-call shifts significantly limit employees’ ability to earn income, pursue an education, care for dependent family members, and enjoy recreation time.” Id. at *22. These burdens affect employees not just during their on-call potential shifts, but for the two hours between the phone call and the shift itself. Id. at 22-23. The Court of Appeals held that Wage Order 7 was designed to prevent unfair scheduling practices such as this, and determined that the phrase “report for work” included the act of calling in. Id. at 23, 25. The wage orders covering workers in other industries use the phrase “report to work” in the same way as Wage Order 7.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals pronounced that “if the employer directs employees to present themselves for work by logging on to a computer remotely, or by appearing at a client’s job site, or by setting out on a trucking route, then the employee ‘reports for work’ by doing those things. And if . . . the employer directs employees to present themselves for work by telephoning the store two hours prior to the start of a shift, then the reporting time requirement is triggered by the telephonic contact.” Id. at 25-26. This conclusion is similar to a California Supreme Court decision that an employer cannot require its employees to keep their pagers and phones on to remain on-call during their rest breaks, which Bryan Schwartz has blogged about before. See Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 2 Cal.5th 257, 269 (2017).

If your employer has asked you to call in before scheduled shifts to determine if you are needed to work, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law today. Click here for more information about Bryan Schwartz Law.

Wednesday, September 5, 2018

Bryan J. Schwartz Awarded 2018 Attorney Advocate Award by The Wage Justice Center

Today, Bryan J. Schwartz, principal at the law firm Bryan Schwartz Law, will accept the 2018 Attorney Advocate Award from the Wage Justice Center at an evening fundraiser in Los Angeles, California. (See press release here).

The Wage Justice Center fights for economic justice on behalf of low-wage workers in California. The non-profit organization specializes in piercing corporate shell games to hold employers accountable when they commit wage theft. 

Bryan Schwartz Law regularly represents low-wage workers in wage and hour class actions. The firm seeks swift relief for its clients, and pursues justice for as long as it takes. 

One of the firm’s signature cases involves wage violations at restaurants in Los Angeles and Orange County, in which the wealthy owner of a defunct business attempted to shield himself from personal liability for the business’s wage violations. After workers filed the class action suit, the employer immediately fired the named plaintiff, later closed his restaurants, and filed for personal and corporate bankruptcy. During nearly eight years of litigation, Bryan and his firm won over $1.5 million in back wages, damages, penalties, fees and costs from the individual employer on behalf of the terminated employee (whose wage loss was determined to be $3,000) after victories in bankruptcy court, a bench trial, a jury trial, several trips to the Court of Appeal, and collections proceedings. See Quiles, et. al. v. Koji’s Japan, Inc. et al. (Orange Cnty. Sup. Ct.) Case No. 30-2010-00425532. (Read more about the Quiles trial here)

The firm continues its fight for the class of restaurant employees who suffered wage violations, after securing a major victory at the court of appeals. In Turman, et al., v. Superior Court (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 969, California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three (in Orange County), held that an individual owner and president of a closely-held corporation may be personally liable in a lawsuit to recover overtime, meal and rest period premiums, tip compensation, and minimum wages under California law. Turman provides the first published state appellate interpretation of Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, the California Supreme Court’s marquee decision on the definition of an “employer,” as it applies to personal rather than corporate liability. On remand, the Superior Court recently ruled that the individual owner of the restaurants was may be liable as a joint employer with respect to the class claims under the Labor Code, Wage Orders, Business & Professions Code, and Private Attorneys’ General Act. (Read more about the Turman decision on our blog here and here).

“I am honored that the Wage Justice Center has recognized my firm’s dogged representation of restaurant workers in the Quiles/Turmanlitigation with the 2018 Attorney Advocate Award,” says Bryan Schwartz. “I have the greatest admiration for my clients – who for eight years have continued this fight to seek justice on behalf of their co-workers.”

For more information about Bryan Schwartz Law, please contact Bryan Schwartz at Bryan@BryanSchwartzLaw.com.





Monday, November 27, 2017

The Supreme Court Denies Certiorari of Ninth Circuit Ruling that Mortgage Underwriters are Non-Exempt Employees

Today, the Supreme Court of the United States summarily denied certiorari to an appeal from a recent Ninth Circuit decision, McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Savings Bank, 862 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. Jul. 5, 2017), which held that mortgage underwriters did not qualify as exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in McKeen-Chaplin, clarifies the legal analysis for evaluating whether an employer has met the second prong of the administrative-exemption test. The administrative-exemption test requires administrative employees to have as their primary duty “the performance of office or non-manual work related to the management or general operations of the employer or the employer’s customers.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200. Notably, the Ninth Circuit utilized the “administrative / production dichotomy” to determine whether the employer met the second prong of the FLSA’s administrative exemption. Under the administrative / production dichotomy framework, “whether [an employee’s] primary duty goes to the heart of internal administration—rather than marketplace offerings” is the crucial test. Thus, if an employee’s duties focus on the core business of a company, e.g., an underwriter working on a bank’s mortgage products, then the employee is not administratively exempt, and is entitled to overtime. Bryan Schwartz Law previously blogged about McKeen-Chaplin here.

In arriving at its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon reasoning in Davis. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2nd Cir. 2009) cert. denied sub nom., a Second Circuit ruling which applied the administrative-production dichotomy to find mortgage loan underwriters were production employees. Bryan Schwartz Law previously blogged about Davis, here.

Employees who produce a company’s core products or services, as opposed to performing “work related to the management or general operations of the employer,” should not be denied overtime based on the FLSA’s administrative exemption.

If you believe your employer has incorrectly classified you as an exempt administrative employee and deprived you of overtime pay even though you produce the core goods or services of your employer, then please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.


Thursday, July 13, 2017

The California Supreme Court Holds PAGA Representative Plaintiffs are Entitled to Robust Discovery


Today, the California Supreme Court issued an important decision, holding that workers prosecuting wage violations under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) are entitled to receive witnesses’/class members’ contact information without having to prove their entire case first. As explained in Williams v. Superior Court (Marshalls of CA), “California law has long made clear that to require a party to supply proof of any claims or defenses as a condition of discovery in support of those claims or defenses is to place the cart before the horse.”[1] The entire decision is required reading for any wage and hour and/or class action practitioner in California, but a few points are worth highlighting here.

I.            PAGA Plaintiffs Are Not Required to Prove the Merits of Their Case Before Receiving State-wide Contact Information for Witnesses/Potential Class Members.

For California employees, the biggest win from the Williams decision is the California Supreme Court’s holding that a worker bringing a representative PAGA enforcement action, like any other plaintiff in a civil state court lawsuit, is not required to prove their case before receiving the information and documents needed to prove their case on behalf of themselves and their co-workers.

The outcome in Williams flows from a plain reading of PAGA and California’s discovery statute, neither of which impose the “modicum of substantial proof” standard MarshallsCA advanced, i.e., “a PAGA-specific heightened proof standard at the threshold, before discovery.”[2] To the contrary, “to insert such a requirement into PAGA would undercut the clear legislative purposes the act was designed to serve” because it would necessarily undermine a representative plaintiff’s ability “to advance the state‘s public policy of affording employees workplaces free of Labor Code violations, notwithstanding the inability of state agencies to monitor every employer or industry.”[3]

Of course, a trial court retains discretion for a “special reason to limit or postpone a representative plaintiff‘s access to contact information for those he or she seeks to represent, but the default position is that such information is within the proper scope of discovery, an essential first step to prosecution of any representative action.”[4]

II.             High Court Reaffirms the Broad Scope of Discovery in California.
The California Supreme Court also used the Williams case to reaffirm the broad scope of civil discovery in California state court. While broad discovery requests may result in “a defendant’s inevitable annoyance,” the Court recognized that the California Legislature “granted such a right anyway, comfortable in the conclusion that ―[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”[5]

The Court also clarified that the three-step framework established in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.[6], not the “compelling interest” analysis in White v. Davis, should be applied to resolve most parties’ privacy objections to discovery requests unless a request constitutes an “obvious invasion[] of interests fundamental to personal autonomy.”[7] The Court made clear that routine requests for witnesses’/class members’ contact information typically do not warrant “compelling interest” scrutiny, and strongly implied that the Hill test should frequently result in the production of witness/class member contact information, particularly where the parties agree to use a Belaire-West notice and opt-out process.[8]

III.            Defendants Asserting “Burden” Objections to Discovery Requests Must Provide Specific Facts About the Cost and/or Administrative Difficulty of Complying.

The Court also underscored that a defendant may not refuse to produce discovery merely because a defendant disagrees with a plaintiff’s legal theory. In so holding, the Court emphasized that “the way to raise” a perceived legal deficiency in a plaintiff’s case “is to plead it as an affirmative defense, and thereafter to bring a motion for summary adjudication or summary judgment, not resist discovery until a plaintiff proves he or she” can overcome the defendant’s affirmative defense.[9] This aspect of the Williams decision will hopefully go a long way towards incentivizing defendants to defend against plaintiffs’ claims on the merits instead of engaging in discovery gamesmanship, typically resulting in unnecessary and costly motion practice.


Moreover, if responding to a discovery request poses a genuine burden for a company, then the company must provide “evidence of the time and cost required to respond” to support its burden objection.[10] While unsurprising, this portion of the opinion should be used by workers’ advocates who receive generalized “burden” objections from defendants which lack any specific facts regarding the nature of the supposed burden to respond. 

In Williams, the Court illustrated its point with an example: “depending on the nature of any computer database Marshalls might maintain, providing information for 10,000 employees might prove little different than for 1,000, or 100.” If Marshalls had shown that, for example, each store had its own computer database of employees’ information unconnected to any other store’s database and no other centralized employee database existed, then the company might have had solid grounds to assert that coordinating data retrieval between “approximately 130 stores” in California would have been too costly and time-consuming.[11] In that case, the trial court might have ordered cost sharing between the parties, or a narrower production of information.[12] On the other hand, if Marshalls had been able to produce contact information relatively easily regardless of whether it produced employee information for one store as opposed to all of its stores, then Marshalls’ burden objection likely would not have been sustained. 

In the actual case, Marshalls provided no “supporting evidence” regarding the nature of the “time and cost required to” produce contact information for the witnesses/potential class members.[13] Accordingly, the company’s “burden” argument lacked any legal merit.[14]

IV.            Conclusion

Williams will be cited by wage and hour practitioners for years to come because it both provides much needed clarification regarding the scope and operation of California’s civil discovery rules as applied to PAGA representative actions, and also affirms the common sense principle that a worker should not have to prove his or her case before receiving the basic information he or she needs to do so.

Workers and workers' advocates should celebrate this tremendous victory weighing in favor of access to justice, and ultimately, robust enforcement of California’s vital labor laws.

***

If you have believe that you and your co-workers are or have been subject to unlawful pay practices, then please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.





[1] Williams v. S.C. (Marshalls of CA), No. S227228, 2017 WL 2980258, slip op. at 20 (Cal. July 13, 2017) (“Williams”)
[2] Williams slip op. at 12, 14.
[3] Williams slip op. at 13.
[4] Williams slip op. 11.
[5] Williams slip op. at 20.
[6] 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35. (1994).
[7] Williams slip op. at 29.
[8] Williams slip op. at 25-29.
[9] Williams slip op. at 31 (citing Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12 (1978)).
[10] Williams slip op. at 18 n. 6.
[11] Williams slip op. at 4.
[12] Williams slip op. at 18 n. 5.
[13] Williams slip op. at 18.
[14] Williams slip op. at 19 (citing Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants, 148 Cal. App. 4th 390, 402 (2007)).