Showing posts with label misclassification. Show all posts
Showing posts with label misclassification. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 15, 2021

A Victory for App-Based Drivers: California Superior Court Strikes Down Proposition 22

A woman wearing a face masks sits in the driver's seat of a car, smiling and looking out the window.


In a momentous win for app-based drivers, the California Superior Court struck down Proposition 22 on August 20th, 2021. Gig companies such as Uber and Lyft spent an unprecedented $200,000,000+ to pass Proposition 22 in order to exempt themselves from treating app-based drivers as employees. Designating these workers as independent contractors allows companies like Uber and Lyft would to avoid their obligations to provide basic protections to their drivers, including a minimum wage, health insurance, contributions to workers compensation, and the ability to unionize. Bryan Schwartz Law has written before about these and other dangers of Prop 22: as independent contractors, drivers are paid an effective rate of about $5.64 per hour, well under the minimum wage, and would be denied an array of vital benefits and protections. 


Although proponents of Proposition 22 claimed that it would protect the independence of app-based drivers, the California Superior Court disagreed in Castellanos. The court even found that a provision of Proposition 22 that prohibited the Legislature from passing laws allowing app-based drivers to unionize only served to “protect the economic interests of the network companies in having a divided, ununionized workforce” and was completely unrelated to the stated goal of protecting drivers. The court found that this provision was therefore outside of the “single-scope” of Proposition 22; however, because the provision was severable, this finding did not impact the rest of the proposition.


Even more striking to the court was how Proposition 22 curtailed the ability of the Legislature to provide a robust system of workers’ compensation, an essential part of our social safety net. Our Legislature’s ability to protect injured workers through an expansive workers’ compensation program is so critical that the power is enshrined in the California Constitution and completely unlimited by any other provision of the Constitution. Only a Constitutional amendment can reduce workers’ right to receive worker compensation. Proposition 22’s attempt to create a statute that reduced the number of employees eligible for workers compensation was therefore unconstitutional. Unlike the provision limiting drivers’ ability to unionize, this provision limiting workers’ compensation was not severable, so the court’s ruling that this provision was unconstitutional meant that the entirety of Proposition 22 was rejected.


Before Proposition 22 was in place, California used the ABC test that was established by the 2018 California Supreme Court decision in Dynamex, and codified by AB5, to determine whether someone is an employee or an independent contractor. Under the ABC test, a worker is an independent contractor only if: 1) the worker is not controlled or directed by their employer in how they perform their work, 2) their work is outside the scope of the employer’s usual business, and 3) the worker is working in an independently established trade or business that matches their work for their employer. The employer must prove each of these elements before it can call a worker an independent contractor. The ABC test makes it much more difficult for employers to classify workers as independent contractors, which allows many more workers to receive the benefits and protections to which they are entitled. 


The decision in Castellanos vindicates the rights of hundreds of thousands of app-based drivers throughout California. This decision will likely be appealed, but it still represents an important step towards ensuring that app-based drivers receive the respect and protections that they deserve.

 

If you believe you have been misclassified as an independent contractor, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Friday, January 29, 2021

California Supreme Court Expands Number of Workers Classified as Employees Rather Than Independent Contractors

The 2020 presidential election successfully ousted an administration and political movement that has sought to undermine workplace protections, and reaffirmed democracy and the rule of law.

But it also saw the overwhelming passage of Proposition 22 in California after gig employers spent a jaw-dropping $200,000,000+

(the most in California history) to write its own law, much to the dismay of worker advocates and to the detriment of gig economy workers. Proposition 22 exempts app-based rideshare and delivery com
panies from their responsibilities under landmark worker protection law A.B. 5 and the Supreme Court of California’s decision in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, which classify drivers as employees.

Good news for workers came early in 2021: the California Supreme Court has determined that the Dynamex decision applies retroactively to cases that arose before Dynamex was decided in 2018. The decision is Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Financing International, Inc.

Dynamex established the “ABC test,” a three-part legal test that makes it more difficult for businesses to ignore worker protections by classifying them as independent contractors. Under the ABC Test, a business can classify a worker as an independent contractor only if the employer can show all three parts:

A)      The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work;

B)      The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and

C)      The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.

If the business cannot prove all three of these parts, the worker is an employee. Unlike independent contractors, employees are guaranteed protections like sick leave, minimum wage, overtime pay, reimbursement for their expenses, health insurance, and the right to organize. Gig employers such as Uber, Lyft, Doordash, and Postmates hoped to avoid these legal obligations  to their workers by bankrolling Proposition 22—which is why its passage was such a stinging defeat for gig workers.

A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had already held that the ABC test applies retroactively in May 2019, but that did not end the debate. On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit decided to ask the California Supreme Court what it thought and withdrew its opinion. In a victory for workers, the California Supreme Court unanimously held on January 14, 2021, that the Dynamex decision should apply retroactively to cases arising before it was decided.

Judicial decisions like Dynamex usually apply retroactively, but the defendant here argued that Dynamex should be an exception because the ABC test was, in their view, a new rule. As such, according to the defendant, it would not be fair to apply Dynamex retroactively. The court disagreed, opining that decisions prior to Dynamex had put hiring entities on notice that the previous state of the law regarding independent contractor status was not firmly settled. To the contrary, the court stated that “fairness and policy considerations underlying our decision in Dynamex favor retroactive application,” because workers’ protections enable “them to provide at least minimally for themselves and their families and to accord them a modicum of dignity and self-respect.” If Dynamex were not applied retroactively, the court feared that many workers would be denied the intended protections of California law.

Though this is a victory, it is a limited one. Statutes of limitations already restrict the number of workers who may assert their rights as employees improperly misclassified as independent contractors. However, Proposition 22 does not apply retroactively, meaning that gig workers have a window in which to exercise their legal rights in light of this decision.

If you have wrongly classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Friday, August 14, 2020

Judge Orders Uber and Lyft to Treat Drivers as Employees

On August 10, a California judge issued a remarkable order blocking Uber and Lyft from continuing to misclassify their drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. This preliminary injunction from Judge  Ethan P. Schulman of San Francisco Superior Court  comes as part of the litigation brought by the State of California against Uber and Lyft because of the ride-hailing companies’ flagrant disregard for their duties under Assembly Bill 5 (A.B. 5). 


A.B. 5 codified the Supreme Court of California’s decision in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, and was signed into law in September of 2019. Under A.B. 5 and Dynamex, drivers for Uber and Lyft should be considered employees, not independent contractors. Despite this, Uber and Lyft have continued to misclassify their drivers as independent contractors. Hopefully, the August 10 injunction forces the companies to finally change course.

 

The court highlighted that when companies like Uber and Lyft misclassify their employees as independent contractors, they deprive them of access to basic workers’ rights and protections including minimum wage, overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, health insurance, paid sick leave, and paid family leave. These worker protections are extremely important to working families and the economy as a whole, especially in the face of the challenges posed by a pandemic. 

 

The court explains that in order to grant a preliminary injunction of Uber and Lyft’s violations of A.B. 5, the government must demonstrate that it had a reasonable probability of prevailing, with a presumption that the nonissuance of an injunction would be harmful to the public. This is different than in an ordinary case with private parties, where the party seeking the injunction faces a higher burden. This is because by enacting a statute, the legislature has already determined that a violation goes against the public interest.

 

In this case, the court opined that the government demonstrated an “overwhelming likelihood” of prevailing and that “substantial public harm” will result without an injunction. According to the court, Uber and Lyft’s violations of A.B. 5 pose, “real harms to real working people.” Under A.B. 5’s “ABC” test, a person is properly classified as an independent contractor if: (A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work; (B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.

 

The judge in this decision primarily examined element B, which requires that the work performed be “outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.” Uber argued, as it has before, that it is a technology company, rather than a company that provides car rides, and that its “actual employees” work in engineering, development, marketing, and operations. Driving, the company insists, is not part of Uber’s usual course of business. The court rejected this argument, instead insisting that Uber could not survive without its drivers. Because drivers are central to Uber and Lyft's business models, they should be classified as employees. 

 

Since the August 10 order, Uber and Lyft have threatened to halt operations in California, and Judge Schulman has denied the companies’ request for an extension of the deadline to appeal. Uber and Lyft have been attempting to delay their compliance with A.B. 5 because the companies are funding a ballot measure, Proposition 22, which would re-classify drivers as independent contractors. In issuing the injunction, however, the judge explained that he could not excuse the companies from compliance with A.B. 5 simply because they are waiting to see if Proposition 22 passes in November.

 

Bryan Schwartz Law has written about A.B. 5 and Dynamex here, here, here, and here. If you believe you have been misclassified as an independent contractor, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

New Decade, New Worker Protections: AB-5, Dynamex, and Independent Contractor vs. Employee Status in 2020


Struggles over newly-in-force AB-5 are already well under way.

AB (California State Assembly Bill) 5 is a newly-enacted California law codifying the landmark California Supreme Court case Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, under which many California workers are considered employees, who better benefit from California legal protections, rather than independent contractors. Bryan Schwartz Law has written about Dynamex here and here, and about AB-5 here. To recap, Dynamex established the “ABC” test for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, with a presumption that a worker is an employee, and with the burden on companies to demonstrate that workers are independent contractors. Id. at 957. To meet this burden, the putative employer must show that the worker: (a) is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity, (b) performs work outside the usual scope of the entity’s business, and (c) is engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business. Id. at 964. Failing to demonstrate any one of these elements is sufficient to show an employee-employer relationship. Id. at 964. AB-5 codified this test for most workers in California.

The business community has mounted a campaign to weaken or eliminate this expansive protection for California workers. For instance, gig economy giants Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash have spent millions of dollars introducing a ballot measure to exempt them from AB-5 and permit them to continue exploiting their drivers. Uber has also changed its operations in California to try and satisfy AB-5, sending a letter to riders explaining their changes and threatening that AB-5 could hurt riders. Uber has also argued that it is a technology company instead of a transportation company (which does not even pass the laugh test), to try to help Uber satisfy the “B” prong of the test.

The trucking industry has also fought AB-5. On New Year’s Eve, federal judge Roger Benitez issued a temporary restraining order temporarily preventing enforcement of AB-5 “as to any motor carrier operating in California,” in the case California Trucking Association v. Becerra, 3:18-cv-02458-BEN-NLM. The temporary restraining order opined that there was a significant likelihood that AB-5’s applicability to truck drivers would be preempted (and thereby unenforceable) by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA” or “F-Quad-A”), which has language that applies to “any motor carrier.”

Los Angeles County Superior Court judge William Highberger went further in an order issued earlier this month in California v. CAL Cartage Transportation Express LLC, BC689320. The Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office filed the case on January 1, 2018, before Dynamex had been decided, and alleged that the company defendants had misclassified their truck drivers as independent contractors when they should have been classified as employees. Following Dynamex and AB-5, the Los Angeles City Attorney argued that the stronger “ABC” test should apply, while the defendant companies maintained that the previous multi-factor independent contractor test set forth in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, should apply instead. The judge sided with the defendant companies, opining that AB-5 was in fact preempted by the FAAAA, under the premise that “Prong B of the ABC test . . . prohibits motor carriers from using independent contractors to provide transportation services.”

The issue is far from decided. Judge Highberger’s decision is surely going to be challenged on appeal, and hundreds of truck drivers have filed labor complaints to enforce their rights under AB-5, signaling further litigation. There also remains the question of whether Dynamex’s ABC test applies retroactively to disputes arising before Dynamex was handed down. Last fall, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals certified this question to the California Supreme Court in Vazquez v. Pan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. The California Supreme Court is also reviewing a state appeals court case, Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, Inc., which held Dynamex to apply retroactively. The struggle over the worker protections of Dynamex and AB-5 goes on.

If you believe you are being treated as an independent contractor when you should be treated as an employee, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Monday, December 30, 2019

Settling for More: 9th Circuit Rules on Standards for Class Action Settlements


In most circumstances, opposing parties can resolve a legal dispute among themselves out of court until a court case is over. Class cases are different. To settle a class case, the parties have to ask the court hearing the case for approval.

This is because in class action settlements, absent class members waive their claims in exchange for the benefits of the settlement. Without notice of the settlement and its key terms, class members could waive their legal claims without realizing it, having a say in the terms of the agreement, or having the opportunity opt out of the agreement. This implicates absent class members’ due process rights.

To protect absent class members’ rights, the hearing court has a special duty to ensure that sufficient notice is provided to class members. The court must also take care that the settlement itself is fair. While courts usually balance and adjudicate competing interests in an adversarial context, the settling parties are in agreement in the context of a class action settlement. Especially concerning is the prospect that the parties could bargain away absent class members’ rights in order to secure a quick resolution that may not be in the class’s best interest.

Earlier this month, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a class action settlement agreement in the high-profile class action case Murphy v. SFBSC Management. A pair of erotic dancers filed a class action case on behalf of 4,681 putative class members who currently or previously worked as erotic dancers for SFBSC Management’s 11 adult entertainment clubs in San Francisco, alleging that they had been misclassified as independent contractors when they should have been classified as employees. Bryan Schwartz Law has blogged about the distinction between employees and independent contractors here and here.

The parties settled and sought court approval. The trial court preliminarily approved the settlement, providing for notice of the settlement agreement to be sent to the class members’ last known mailing addresses, posted at the nightclubs’ dressing rooms, and posted online on a website created for this purpose. Initially, 1,546 notices were returned as undeliverable; after the settlement administrator performed address traces and resent notices, 560 notices remained undeliverable. Many class members lodged objections on several bases, but the court approved the settlement. The objectors appealed.

On appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed with almost all of the objectors’ complaints about the settlement agreement and the notice process.

I.                    Adequacy of the Notice

The objectors attacked the notice of class settlement in two ways. First, they argued that the notice did not inform class members that other similar lawsuits had been filed by other erotic dancers. The 9th Circuit rejected this claim—the only argument the objectors raised that the court rejected—holding that the class notices did not need to provide information to class members regarding related cases. Likewise, the notice did not need to describe any objections to the settlement agreement that had been raised.

Second, the objectors argued that the process of distributing the notice was insufficient. In particular, the objectors argued that the failure to provide any electronic notice (besides the website) was not the best practicable notice under the circumstances. The 9th Circuit agreed, noting that as many as 12% of the class received no notice by mail. In addition, the posters hung in the dressing rooms could only be viewed by current employees, whereas the class included former employees as well. Importantly, electronic notice may have been warranted if “reasonably calculated to appraise all class members of the settlement,” including email or even social media or “relevant online messaging boards.”

II.                 Standard of Review

Before the court examined the fairness of the agreement, the court first clarified the standard for courts to assess class action settlements. A court reviewing a class action settlement before the class has been certified requires a higher standard of fairness and a more probing inquiry. Reviewing courts should be on the lookout for subtle signs of collusion between the parties. The trial court in this case had begun its analysis with a presumption of fairness where a settlement was the product of arms-length negotiations between experienced attorneys. This standard was incorrect. The 9th Circuit also stated that it would not accept the mere presence of a neutral mediator as conclusive proof that the settlement was fair.

III.              Fairness of the Agreement

Next, the court examined several aspects of the settlement agreement that indicated possible unfairness. One of these was a clear sailing agreement with regards to attorneys’ fees. Under the provision, SFBSC Management agreed not to contest class counsel’s request for up to $1,000,000 in attorneys’ fees. The 9th Circuit observed that such agreements could be indicia that the agreement was reached at the expense of the class’s interests, especially in light of the high amount of attorneys’ fees requested.

The free sailing provision in this case called for attorneys’ fees greater than the net $864,115 to be distributed to the class. The parties arrived at the high amount of attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the total benefit of the settled claims, including the estimated value of two other areas of relief provided in the settlement agreement: (1) a Dance Fee Payment Pool, and (2) injunctive relief. Objectors challenged the sufficiency of the valuations for each, which had been set at $1,000,000 each.

Under the settlement agreement, class members could elect to receive payment from the Dance Fee Payment Pool of up to $1,000,000 in lieu of a lump sum cash settlement share. This money would come from the charges that the nightclubs would ordinarily retain from customer payments per dance. Dancers who selected this option could receive up to $8,000, but dancers had a limited amount of time in which to accrue payments from the Dance Fee Payment Pool.  

The court likened the Dance Fee Payment Pool to coupons, with reduced value to the class. This option had an expiration date, was not transferable, and required class members who no longer worked with SFBSC Management to do business with it again in order to claim the value. The 9th Circuit held that a court approving a class action settlement could not rely on such valuations except in the rare instance when non-monetary relief could be valuated exactly. Here, the parties did not put forth any evidence to support their valuation of the coupons.

Similarly, the 9th Circuit was troubled by the $1,000,000 valuation of the injunctive relief. The settlement agreement provided that SFBSC Management would allow dancers to elect whether to work as employees or independent contractors, each with its own form of compensation and employment structure. The court faulted the trial court for failing to make any findings specifically justifying the valuation of this benefit at $1,000,000.

The court was also wary of the enhancement awards called for in the settlement agreement for the named plaintiffs, to be taken from the general settlement fund. While the court was not concerned by the $5,000 enhancement payments in recognition of the plaintiffs’ efforts to represent the class and prosecute the case, the court found suspect the $20,000 enhancement payment for the general release the plaintiffs signed. The court saw no service to the class compensated by this enhancement. As such, the court viewed the enhancement as evidence of a potential side deal between the named plaintiffs and the employer, at the class’s expense, giving rise to a potential conflict of interest.

The court also looked at the settlement agreement’s reversionary effect. If class members did not cash their checks, those amounts would have reverted to SFBSC Management, rather than being redistributed to the class or a charitable organization that furthers the beneficial goals of the litigation. The 9th Circuit observed that reversionary agreements can indicate unfairness to the class, especially when coupons are involved. Combined, these factors drove the 9th circuit to reverse the trial court’s approval of the settlement agreement and remand for further proceedings.

If you have a dispute with your employer, contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.

Tuesday, April 9, 2019

You Can’t Split This Baby—Employees Cannot be Forced to Arbitrate Parts of PAGA Claims, Appeals Court Rules

Arbitration agreements are more and more popular among employers (and the United States Supreme Court) as a way to get out of concerted actions brought by wronged employees. In California, they cannot be enforced to stop state prosecution of wage claims through qui tam representative plaintiffs under the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq. See Iskanian v. CLS Trans. Los Angeles, LLC (2004) 59 Cal.4th 348, 382-92.

Nevertheless, employers have sought ways to force PAGA actions out of court and into arbitration, arguing that PAGA claims for wages should go to arbitration, while only the statutory PAGA penalties could remain before a court. A handful of cases in the Courts of Appeal have dealt with this issue, one of which, Lawson v. ZB, N.A., (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 705, is pending before the California Supreme Court. Bryan Schwartz Law has submitted an amicus brief to the California Supreme Court in this case.


On March 28, 2019, a California appellate court issued another decision rejecting this argument, adding to the list of decisions protecting PAGA enforcement in this rapidly developing area of the law.  See Zakaryan v. The Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. (Mar. 28, 2019) __Cal.App.5th__. To understand why Zakaryan is noteworthy, we must understand the legislative intent behind PAGA. Before PAGA was enacted in 2003, California struggled to enforce the worker protections in the Labor Code. The financial crisis was in full effect, and the state government could not afford to oversee California’s massive workforce. So it decided to let employees enforce the Labor Code themselves, on behalf of the state, provided that first they comply with some straightforward procedures and the state decides not to take the case itself. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3. A PAGA action is “brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699. PAGA also provides for penalties to be assessed against liable employers. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(f). The state gets 75% of any PAGA award, while the employee gets 25% plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699(g)(1), (i).

Employers have tried to contract around PAGA using arbitration agreements. It hasn’t worked. Although arbitration agreements can waive employees’ class action rights (Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018)), employers cannot force the state to arbitrate its claims, which are vindicated through PAGA. Iskanian, 59 Cal.4th at 378-92. The suing representative plaintiff just stands in the state’s shoes. Id at 386-87. Because an employee cannot contractually waive a right belonging to the state, an arbitration agreement cannot waive an employee’s right to proceed under PAGA.

Despite this, The Men’s Wearhouse tried to argue that a PAGA claim for wages should go to arbitration. The California Court of Appeals didn’t buy it in Zakaryan (Mar. 28, 2019) __Cal.App.5th__.

Plaintiff Zakaryan worked for The Men’s Wearhouse as a store manager from 2002 until 2016, before suing under PAGA, alleging that the company wrongfully misclassified its store managers as exempt from California’s overtime and meal and rest break laws. The Men’s Wearhouse moved to send the portion of Mr. Zakaryan’s claims involving underpaid wages to arbitration. It lost, and appealed.

After a careful analysis of PAGA and arbitration law, the appellate court rejected The Men’s Wearhouse’s argument for two reasons. First, splitting the PAGA claim would violate California’s “primary rights theory,” under which “one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief.” A PAGA claim, the court ruled, involves “one and only one ‘particular injury’—namely the injury to the public that the ‘state labor law enforcement agencies’ were created to safeguard.” Therefore, a PAGA claim cannot be split between a court and arbitration.

Second, sending part of the case to arbitration would run contrary to labor and arbitration law. PAGA awards the state 75% and the aggrieved employee the remainder of “a single civil penalty,” the court observed, which could not be properly heeded if portions of the civil penalties were syphoned off to arbitration. Moreover, “a PAGA claim is, fundamentally, a representative claim,” in which the suing employee represents other aggrieved employees in a suit brought on behalf of the state. As such, there was no individual portion of the claim to break off in an arbitration proceeding. In addition, Mr. Zakaryan had elected to pursue claims under PAGA’s representative action mechanism rather than his individual claims. Forcing him to arbitrate as if he had brought individual claims would effectively hijack his case. Finally, splitting the PAGA action would send the most important aspect of the claim to be determined—the employer’s liability—to the arbitrator, thereby circumventing the state’s right to have its enforcement action heard in court.

The California Supreme Court will soon decide this issue in Lawson.

If you have California wage claims and your employer is trying to force you into arbitration, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.



Monday, April 30, 2018

California Supreme Court Narrows Application of "Independent Contractor" Status


Today's ruling in Dynamex v. Superior Court (S222732) (April 30, 2018) is an 85-page dissertation, authored by the Chief Justice, for a unanimous court, meant to limit abuse of the independent contractor designation in California. Read the decision here. 

In an era when the United States Supreme Court’s majority increasingly buries its head in the sand and resorts to overly formalistic readings, tilting the scales of justice toward exoneration of unscrupulous businesses, it is refreshing to read Dynamex. The California Supreme Court consistently keeps front and center the unequal bargaining power real California workers experience when going to work. Dynamex helps restore balance, placing the burden where it should be – on businesses, if they hope to show that their workers, or any of them, are independent contractors, not subject to the protection of the Wage Orders that enforce the California Labor Code. Dynamex is a win also for businesses that play fair, because they will not have to compete against others cutting corners on wages, and for the general public, because the Wage Orders and Labor Code are fundamentally designed to protect the health and welfare of everyone in California workplaces. (Slip Op. at 58-60).

In the first pages of Dynamex, the Court notes a U.S. Department of Labor report finding that the distinction between independent contractors and employees is the most important factor in determining whether a worker will receive labor, employment, and other statutory protections. Employers hold back billions of dollars a year in taxes based upon improper independent contractor designations, and millions of workers suffer the consequences. (Slip Op. at 2). 

The workers in Dynamex argued that the same tests determine whether supposed independent contractors are actually employees entitled to Wage Order protections, as would determine whether two entities are joint employers - namely, the tests in Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64: whether an alleged employer has a) control over wages, hours and working conditions, or; b) suffers or permits work to occur; or c) engages a worker to perform work. Dynamex upheld the Court of Appeal decision, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the "suffer or permit to work" definition of "employ" contained in the Wage Orders may be relied upon in evaluating whether a worker is an employee. (Slip Op. at 46-47). The company had argued that courts could only use the old independent contractor test from S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 (Borello), but the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court rejected this view. (Slip Op. at 6-7, 46).

Instead, the Court held that, in evaluating the “suffer or permit” test under Martinez, for the purpose of determining independent contractor versus employee status, courts should apply the “ABC test.” Though, as of today, I find no state cases prior to Dynamex in California that invoked the ABC test, I predict there will be hundreds of “ABC test” decisions in the months and years to come.
 “Under this test, a worker is properly considered an independent contractor to whom a wage order does not apply only if the hiring entity establishes: (A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity.” (Slip Op. at 7). The Court repeatedly emphasized that the it is an alleged employer’s burden to prove independent contractor status, and that doing so requires meeting all three prongs of the ABC test. (Slip Op. at 64, 66-68).

The Court recommended that, if deciding B or C is easier than A (as will usually be the case), then a court should begin by deciding B or C – since all three prongs must be met. (Slip Op. at 76). In other words, if a delivery driver without an independent delivery business is being classified as an independent contractor by a delivery company – a court likely need go no further, because the company will have failed prongs B and C.

More analysis of Dynamex to come...

If you believe you are misclassified as an independent contractor and should be paid as an employee, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.

Friday, April 28, 2017

Defeating Chindarah v. Pick Up Stix Releases

California employers sometimes seek to nip wage and hour class actions in the bud by buying off individual class members for nominal payments. At least one poorly-reasoned California appellate decision, Chindarah v. Pick Up Stix, 171 Cal. App. 4th 796 (2009), seems to permit it. In a recent independent contractor misclassification class action brought by Bryan Schwartz Law, Marino v. CAcafe, the primary defendant tried just such a tactic, mere weeks after the case was filed late last year. The corporate manager asked each employee-former employee to sign a release based upon a supposed “restructuring” but failed to disclose the existence of the workers’ just-filed lawsuit. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a strongly-worded opinion, invalidating all releases improperly obtained from putative class members by the defendants, despite Chindarah, and ordering related relief because the employer’s “communications with the putative class members concealed material information and were misleading.” Marino v. CAcafe, Inc. et al., Case No. 4:16-cv-06291-YGR, slip op. at 3 (filed Apr. 28, 2017) (full opinion available here).



The court explained that “[w]hile the evidence does not indicate the high degree of coercion present in other cases, the fact remains that [the defendants] communicated with putative class members after the lawsuit was filed, but before they had received any formal notice and before plaintiff’s counsel had been given an opportunity to communicate with them.” Id. at 3. Importantly, the defendants’ “communications did not inform putative class members that there was a lawsuit pending that concerned their legal rights, the nature of the claims, plaintiff’s counsel’s contact information, the status of the case, or any other information that might have permitted them to allow them to make an informed decision about the waiver of their rights.” Id. at 4. This conduct “undermine[d] the purposes of Rule 23 and require[d] curative action by the court.” Id. at 3. To correct the harmful effects of defendants’ improper communications, the court:
·     invalidated all releases obtained from putative class members,
·     prohibited the defendants from requesting any reimbursement of payments made,
·    ordered curative notice be issued to all putative class members regarding their rights and the court’s intervention on their behalf (paid for by the defendants),
·    enjoined the defendants responsible for making the communications from engaging in any further ex parte communications with putative class members regarding the litigation or any release of claims until the court has the opportunity to rule on the issue of conditional certification of the FLSA collective action, and
·   ruled that class members who signed releases in exchange for payments could keep those payments, regardless of the outcome of the case.
Id. at 5.

Workers’ advocates should not hesitate to bring motions for corrective action when defendants attempt to subvert the rights of workers and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (governing class actions) by embarking on a Chindarah campaign. A court need not find a high degree of coercive conduct on the part of an employer to warrant invalidation of releases obtained from putative class members. If the employer uses misleading tactics to obtain releases from putative class action members – like omitting the fact that a class action has been filed against the defendant for wage violations, and failing to disclose contact information of the plaintiffs’ lawyers – then you may have strong grounds to remedy the defendant’s misconduct. See generally Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); Retiree Support Grp. of Contra Costa Cty. v. Contra Costa Cty., 2016 WL 4080294, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2016) (collecting 8 cases).

Contact Bryan Schwartz Law with any questions about questionable releases of wage and hour claims.