Earlier this month, the Supreme Court of California ruled that an employee does not lose standing to pursue a claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code § 2698, et seq. (PAGA) where that employee settles and dismisses his or her individual claims. In Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (full opinion here), the Court rejected the employer’s injury-focused argument that an employee who settles his or her individual claims is no longer a “person aggrieved” for purposes of PAGA. The result is a positive judicial step in the right direction in ensuring that PAGA will continue to be a viable tool that may be used to protect the public interest in enforcement of the State’s labor laws.
The Plaintiff in Kim brought a putative class action claiming that he had been misclassified as exempt from overtime laws. The operative complaint alleged claims for failure to pay wages and overtime (Cal. Labor Code § 1194), failure to provide meal and rest periods (Cal. Labor Code § 226.7), failure to provide accurate time statements (Cal. Labor Code § 226(a)), waiting time penalties (Cal. Labor Code § 203), and unfair competition (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). It also sought civil penalties under PAGA. The employer compelled Plaintiff to arbitration and the PAGA litigation - which could not be compelled to arbitration, under Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles (as explained here) - was stayed pending arbitration. While the PAGA action was stayed, the employer made a statutory offer to settle Plaintiff’s individual claims pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998. Despite the settlement encompassing only Kim's "individual claims" (as discussed in footnote 7 of the Supreme Court opinion), the company sought and the court granted summary adjudication on the PAGA claim, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing because his rights had been completely redressed by the settlement of his individual claims. The Appellate Court affirmed, leaving the California Supreme Court to weigh in on standing in PAGA cases.
Looking to the statutory language, the Supreme Court concluded that the settlement of individual claims does not strip an individual employee of standing to bring a PAGA claim. First, the plain language of PAGA only requires that a plaintiff be an aggrieved employee – someone “who was employed by the alleged violator” and “against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” In rejecting the employer’s argument that a continuing injury was required to meet this definition, the Court explained that an injury-centric focus was misplaced as PAGA standing is defined in terms of an employer’s violations rather than an employee’s injuries. PAGA does not require an employee to claim any economic injury resulted from a labor violation, only that the labor violation itself occurred. Whereas the employer’s reading would read in requirements not found in the text itself, PAGA’s language only requires that an employee have suffered “one or more of the alleged violations” committed, which permits an employee to serve as a PAGA representative for violations that the employee did not personally experience, as the Court of Appeal in Huff v. Securitas had explained (see our amicus brief here for discussion of Huff).
The Court went on to discuss that injury is not a requirement for civil penalties; damages and civil penalties serve different purposes. In the case of PAGA, the statutory purpose is to remediate present violations and deter future violations as a matter of public interest, not to redress employees injuries. The Court also distinguished PAGA actions from class actions, emphasizing that whereas in a class action the representative only possesses his or her own claim for relief, a PAGA claim is brought on behalf of all affected employees as the state’s designated proxy, as in a qui tam action.
Turning to broader policy considerations, the Court explained that a narrower interpretation of who was an aggrieved employee for purposes of PAGA would have the effect of eliminating employees that settled their claims from the group of individuals eligible to receive a share of the penalties, which in turn would mitigate or potentially completely eliminate the amount of penalties that the state could collect. The Court also reasoned that, in light of plaintiffs' recognized ability to bring stand-alone PAGA claims, standing for a PAGA claim cannot be dependent on the maintenance of an individual claim as PAGA-only cases are not cases in which individual relief has been sought. Further, as there are numerous Labor Code violations that do not have a private right of action (for example, Cal. Labor Code § 558, which we previously discussed here) but can be vindicated in a PAGA action, it would be inconsistent to require a plaintiff to have an unredressed injury to have standing. Finally, the Court rejected as unsupported the employer’s arguments that the legislative history supported its argument or that Plaintiff should be precluded from raising his claim.
Notably, the Court also described Reins's conduct as "troubling." Specifically, Reins explicitly carved out Plaintiff's PAGA claim and made its settlement offer pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 998, which permits defendants to recover defense costs if a jury awards a smaller award to the plaintiff than the defendant previously offered in settlement. The Court opined that "if Reins's prior conduct did not amount to an estoppel, this turnabout was hardly fair play," and observed that reaching a contrary holding would present plaintiffs with a difficult choice: "either reject the offer and risk incurring substantial liability for costs or accept the offer and lose the ability to pursue the PAGA claim."
Ultimately, the Court’s ruling in Kim is an important step in protecting employees’ rights by upholding a system designed to ensure that California’s Labor laws are properly enforced. PAGA remains an important and efficient tool in curbing an employers’ widespread misconduct. If you are seeking to assert wage claims representing your co-workers, contact Bryan Schwartz Law.
Showing posts with label settlement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label settlement. Show all posts
Monday, March 23, 2020
Monday, December 30, 2019
Settling for More: 9th Circuit Rules on Standards for Class Action Settlements
In
most circumstances, opposing parties can resolve a legal dispute among
themselves out of court until a court case is over. Class cases are different. To
settle a class case, the parties have to ask the court hearing the case for
approval.
This
is because in class action settlements, absent class members waive their claims
in exchange for the benefits of the settlement. Without notice of the
settlement and its key terms, class members could waive their legal claims
without realizing it, having a say in the terms of the agreement, or having the
opportunity opt out of the agreement. This implicates absent class members’ due
process rights.
To
protect absent class members’ rights, the hearing court has a special duty to
ensure that sufficient notice is provided to class members. The court must also
take care that the settlement itself is fair. While courts usually balance and
adjudicate competing interests in an adversarial context, the settling parties are
in agreement in the context of a class action settlement. Especially concerning
is the prospect that the parties could bargain away absent class members’
rights in order to secure a quick resolution that may not be in the class’s
best interest.
Earlier
this month, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a class action settlement
agreement in the high-profile class action case Murphy
v. SFBSC Management. A pair of erotic dancers
filed a class action case on behalf of 4,681 putative class members who currently
or previously worked as erotic dancers for SFBSC Management’s 11 adult
entertainment clubs in San Francisco, alleging that they had been misclassified
as independent contractors when they should have been classified as employees. Bryan
Schwartz Law has blogged about the distinction between employees and
independent contractors here
and here.
The
parties settled and sought court approval. The trial court preliminarily
approved the settlement, providing for notice of the settlement agreement to be
sent to the class members’ last known mailing addresses, posted at the
nightclubs’ dressing rooms, and posted online on a website created for this
purpose. Initially, 1,546 notices were returned as undeliverable; after the
settlement administrator performed address traces and resent notices, 560
notices remained undeliverable. Many class members lodged objections on several
bases, but the court approved the settlement. The objectors appealed.
On
appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed with almost all of the objectors’ complaints
about the settlement agreement and the notice process.
I.
Adequacy of the Notice
The
objectors attacked the notice of class settlement in two ways. First, they
argued that the notice did not inform class members that other similar lawsuits
had been filed by other erotic dancers. The 9th Circuit rejected this claim—the
only argument the objectors raised that the court rejected—holding that the class
notices did not need to provide information to class members regarding related
cases. Likewise, the notice did not need to describe any objections to the
settlement agreement that had been raised.
Second,
the objectors argued that the process of distributing the notice was
insufficient. In particular, the objectors argued that the failure to provide
any electronic notice (besides the website) was not the best practicable notice
under the circumstances. The 9th Circuit agreed, noting that as many as 12% of
the class received no notice by mail. In addition, the posters hung in the
dressing rooms could only be viewed by current employees, whereas the class
included former employees as well. Importantly, electronic notice may have been
warranted if “reasonably calculated to appraise all class members of the
settlement,” including email or even social media or “relevant online messaging
boards.”
II.
Standard of Review
Before
the court examined the fairness of the agreement, the court first clarified the
standard for courts to assess class action settlements. A court reviewing a
class action settlement before the class has been certified requires a higher
standard of fairness and a more probing inquiry. Reviewing courts should be on
the lookout for subtle signs of collusion between the parties. The trial court
in this case had begun its analysis with a presumption of fairness where a
settlement was the product of arms-length negotiations between experienced
attorneys. This standard was incorrect. The 9th Circuit also stated that it
would not accept the mere presence of a neutral mediator as conclusive proof
that the settlement was fair.
III.
Fairness of the
Agreement
Next,
the court examined several aspects of the settlement agreement that indicated possible
unfairness. One of these was a clear sailing agreement with regards to
attorneys’ fees. Under the provision, SFBSC Management agreed not to contest
class counsel’s request for up to $1,000,000 in attorneys’ fees. The 9th
Circuit observed that such agreements could be indicia that the agreement was
reached at the expense of the class’s interests, especially in light of the
high amount of attorneys’ fees requested.
The
free sailing provision in this case called for attorneys’ fees greater than the
net $864,115 to be distributed to the class. The parties arrived at the high
amount of attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the total benefit of the settled claims,
including the estimated value of two other areas of relief provided in the
settlement agreement: (1) a Dance Fee Payment Pool, and (2) injunctive relief. Objectors
challenged the sufficiency of the valuations for each, which had been set at
$1,000,000 each.
Under
the settlement agreement, class members could elect to receive payment from the
Dance Fee Payment Pool of up to $1,000,000 in lieu of a lump sum cash
settlement share. This money would come from the charges that the nightclubs
would ordinarily retain from customer payments per dance. Dancers who selected
this option could receive up to $8,000, but dancers had a limited amount of
time in which to accrue payments from the Dance Fee Payment Pool.
The
court likened the Dance Fee Payment Pool to coupons, with reduced value to the
class. This option had an expiration date, was not transferable, and required
class members who no longer worked with SFBSC Management to do business with it
again in order to claim the value. The 9th Circuit held that a court approving
a class action settlement could not rely on such valuations except in the rare
instance when non-monetary relief could be valuated exactly. Here, the parties
did not put forth any evidence to support their valuation of the coupons.
Similarly,
the 9th Circuit was troubled by the $1,000,000 valuation of the injunctive
relief. The settlement agreement provided that SFBSC Management would allow
dancers to elect whether to work as employees or independent contractors, each
with its own form of compensation and employment structure. The court faulted
the trial court for failing to make any findings specifically justifying the valuation
of this benefit at $1,000,000.
The
court was also wary of the enhancement awards called for in the settlement
agreement for the named plaintiffs, to be taken from the general settlement
fund. While the court was not concerned by the $5,000 enhancement payments in
recognition of the plaintiffs’ efforts to represent the class and prosecute the
case, the court found suspect the $20,000 enhancement payment for the general
release the plaintiffs signed. The court saw no service to the class compensated
by this enhancement. As such, the court viewed the enhancement as evidence of a
potential side deal between the named plaintiffs and the employer, at the
class’s expense, giving rise to a potential conflict of interest.
The
court also looked at the settlement agreement’s reversionary effect. If class
members did not cash their checks, those amounts would have reverted to SFBSC
Management, rather than being redistributed to the class or a charitable
organization that furthers the beneficial goals of the litigation. The 9th
Circuit observed that reversionary agreements can indicate unfairness to the
class, especially when coupons are involved. Combined, these factors drove the
9th circuit to reverse the trial court’s approval of the settlement agreement
and remand for further proceedings.
If
you have a dispute with your employer, contact Bryan Schwartz Law
today.
Monday, October 1, 2018
Governor Brown Signs Wave of Sexual Harassment Legislation

Yesterday,
Governor Jerry Brown signed into law numerous amendments to the sexual
harassment provisions of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”). The bills were part of a wave of sexual-harassment-related
legislation resulting from the groundswell of public support for the #Metoo
movement. While the Governor vetoed many of the sexual-harassment-related bills
that made it to his desk, the signed bills provide important new protections
for employees in California. This blog post discusses some of these bills.
I. SB 1300 clarifies and expands employee rights under FEHA.
I. SB 1300 clarifies and expands employee rights under FEHA.
Governor Brown
signed SB 1300, a bill which
clarifies and strengthens the rights of employees who seek to shed light on
workplace harassment and other discrimination.
A. A single instance of sexually harassing conduct may trigger a triable sexual harassment claim.
Perhaps most
importantly, SB 1300 clarifies the “severe or pervasive” legal standard for
proving sexual harassment claims (sexual, or otherwise, under the FEHA). Under the FEHA (and the federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title VII), sexual harassment is actionable if the sexual conduct
is so “severe or pervasive” as to create a hostile work environment. “Severe or
pervasive” harassment alone triggers the action, unlike other discrimination
and retaliation claims, which may become actionable only if the employee
experiences a tangible loss or denial of job benefits. See 2 Cal. Code. Regs. § 11034, subd. (f); Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68
(1986); Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal.4th 264, 279, 284 (2006).
SB 1300 clarifies
that under FEHA’s “severe or pervasive” standard, “a single incident of
harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the
existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Id. The legislature rejected the “stray remarks doctrine,” affirming the decision in Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal.4th 512 (2010) – in other words, a single harassing remark should not be dismissed as being merely a “stray remark,” for the purpose of assessing an employer’s liability. It is also no defense for an employer that a particular occupation may have had more frequent sexual commentary or conduct in the past (disapproving Kelley v. Conco Companies, 196 Cal.App.4th 191 (2011)). Indeed, the Legislature went so far as to declare expressly that: “Harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.” Id., subd. (e) (citing and adopting Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal.App.4th 243 (2009).
SB 1300 makes it
more likely that victims of sexual harassment will get their day in court. What
action may constitute “severe” or “pervasive” harassment has often been highly
contested in sexual harassment cases, and unfortunately, in the past, some
courts have ruled that workplace behavior that most women would find
abusive was neither “severe or pervasive.” For example, in Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d
917 (9th Cir. 2000) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a single
incident in which a fellow employee touched a plaintiff's breast under her
sweater, while very offensive, did not rise to the level of “severe or
pervasive” harassment for which Title VII and FEHA offer a remedy. On this
basis, the appellate court upheld the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the employer, which meant that the plaintiff’s claims could not
proceed to trial. Notably, last year, Alex Kozinski, who penned Brooks, stepped down from his seat on
the Ninth Circuit rather than face an investigation into complaints of
harassment by numerous women, including his former employees. SB 1300 expressly
overturns Brooks’s nauseating “single
grope” rule for claims brought under FEHA. Gov’t Code § 12923, subd. (b).
B.
Employers have a duty to
prevent third party harassment of all stripes.
SB 1300 creates liability
for employers who fail to prevent unlawful harassment of employees by
non-employees where the employer knew or should have known of the discrimination
and failed to take appropriate remedial action. This provision now extends not only to sexual
harassment, but all forms of harassment based on a protected status. Gov’t Code §
12940.
C.
Employers may not obtain
costs for plaintiffs’ worthy FEHA claims.
FEHA authorizes a
court in certain circumstances and in its discretion to award the prevailing
party in a civil action reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert
witness fees. California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 permits defendants
to recover defense costs if a jury awards a smaller award to the plaintiff than
the defendant previously offered in settlement. A defendant’s section 998 offer
in a FEHA case used to have the effect of exerting pressure on a plaintiff to
accept a settlement rather than face the prospect of covering defendant’s
costs, even if the plaintiff prevailed at trial.
SB 1300 provides that
a defendant may only receive fees and costs, regardless of any settlement offer, if a case is “frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it
clearly became so.”
Gov’t Code § 12965, subd. (b). The new law allows plaintiffs with worthy claims
to seek their day in court without worrying about being on the hook for
defendants’ fees and costs.
D. Release of claims agreements and non-disparagement
agreements related sexual harassment claims are unlawful.
SB 1300 prohibits employers
from requiring employees to sign non-disparagement agreements as well as
release of claims agreements as a condition of employment, continued employment, a raise, or bonus. Gov’t Code §
12964.5. These provisions will prevent employers from coercing or tricking employees into signing agreements that effectively silence them discussing workplace harassment or that strip them of their right to bring a claim under FEHA.
II. SB 820 prohibits confidentiality provisions in sexual harassment settlements.
II. SB 820 prohibits confidentiality provisions in sexual harassment settlements.
It has become a
common practice for employers to condition settlement of sexual
harassment disputes on a complaining employee’s silence. Going forward, such
provisions are expressly void and unenforceable for claims that have been filed
in an administrative action or in court. SB 820 prohibits
employers from conditioning settlement of certain claims of sexual assault,
sexual harassment, or harassment or discrimination on the employee’s silence. The bill does allow for a provision that shields the identity of the claimant and all facts that could lead to the discovery of his or her identity, including pleadings filed in court to be included within a settlement agreement upon the request of the claimant. However, this provision does not apply if a government agency or public official is a party to the settlement agreement. This
bill extends to disputes beyond the employment context, and takes effect on
January 1, 2019.
III. AB 3109 voids contracts and settlement provisions that seek to waive a party’s right to testify in a government proceeding concerning alleged criminal conduct or sexual harassment.
III. AB 3109 voids contracts and settlement provisions that seek to waive a party’s right to testify in a government proceeding concerning alleged criminal conduct or sexual harassment.
AB 3109 makes void and unenforceable any contract or settlement provision that waives a party’s right to testify in an
administrative, legislative, or judicial proceeding concerning alleged criminal
conduct or alleged sexual harassment, when the party has been required or requested
to attend the proceeding. Civil Code § 1670.11. Like SB
1300 and SB 820, AB 3109 frees employees who have experienced sexual harassment
and others to share their experiences with the public. This law takes effect on
January 1, 2019.
IV. SB 1343 brings sexual harassment training to more workplaces.
IV. SB 1343 brings sexual harassment training to more workplaces.
Employers of five
or more employees, including temporary or seasonal employees, are now required
to provide at least two hours of sexual harassment training to supervisory
employees and at least one hour of sexual harassment training to non-supervisory employees by January 1, 2020, and every two years thereafter. See SB 1343;
Gov’t Code §§ 12950, 12950.1. This is a major expansion of FEHA’s sexual
harassment training requirements, as the law previously extended training only
to supervisory employees of employers with fifty or more employees. This
expansion recognizes the value of educating all employees that they have a
right to work in an environment free of sexual harassment and associated
retaliation.
V. Conclusion
V. Conclusion
In the words of
Martin Luther King, Jr. “Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do
that.” California’s new laws will ensure that more victims of workplace harassment
and others have their day in court and can more freely shed light on problems that persist in California workplaces.
If you have been a victim of sexual harassment or unwanted sexual advances in the workplace, please contact Bryan Schwartz Law today.
Labels:
California,
FEHA,
settlement,
sexual harassment
Friday, March 4, 2016
District Courts in Ninth Circuit Increase Scrutiny of Reversions After Allen v. Bedolla (9th Cir. 2015)
Last year, this blog covered the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion in Allen v. Bedolla, vacating
a class action settlement for, among other reasons, the parties’ agreement to a
reversionary settlement. 787 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2015). Since Bedolla was handed down from on high,
district courts throughout the Ninth Circuit have applied the teachings in Bedolla by increasing their scrutiny of
class action settlements containing reversions.
In a variation on the common
pairing of a claims-made, reversionary settlement, the parties in Banks v. Nissan North America, Inc., a
consumer class action related to faulty car brakes, agreed to a reversion of
any reduction in attorney’s fees ordered by the court. No. 11-CV-2022-PJH, 2015
WL 7710297, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2015). The district court denied
plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of class action settlement because, not
only did class counsel attempt to receive twelve times the amount paid to class
members, class counsel agreed to revert to defendant any “reduction of the
attorneys’ fee award.” Id. at *12. Put
more plainly, if the court found that class counsel was asking for too much
money from the class, then defendant would have received a windfall instead of
the class benefiting from the savings. Id.
at *13. While there were additional reasons given by the court for its denial
of final approval, the presence of a reversion was an important indication that
the proposed settlement was not “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 23(e).
Bedolla
has also been invoked to strike down a proposed class settlement where any funds
not claimed by the class would have been used to pay defendants’ employer taxes
instead of the class or cy pres. The
court in Sanchez v. Frito-Lay, Inc.
rightfully wondered “why it would be fair to the putative class members to
satisfy Defendant's employer payroll tax obligation out of the residual
settlement amount” instead of directing those funds to the cy pres. No. 1:14-CV-00797
AWI, 2015 WL 4662636, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015) report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-797-AWI-MJS, 2015 WL
5138101 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2015); see
also Millan v. Cascade Water Servs.,
Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593, 612 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (also citing to Bedolla, denying proposed class
settlement, and noting that “[i]f
unclaimed funds are to revert to a defendant the parties should explain why
those funds should revert to Defendant.”)
Furthermore, the court pointed out
that “[t]o the extent that the parties contend that this does not act as a reversion,
as the money is not directly returned to Defendant, the net effect is the same”
because “there is no indication that class members benefit from that provision
of the settlement.” Id. Just like
calling a clerical employee a “manager” does not make him so, parties cannot fix
the inherent problems with reversions in class settlements by sending the
class’s money to the IRS on behalf of the defendant instead of directly
returning the money to the defendant. Accordingly, the court kiboshed
plaintiffs’ motion for class and conditional certification.
Even where a proposed settlement is eventually
approved, a court is given pause by the presence of a reversionary settlement,
especially when attorney’s fees are pegged to the nominal common fund instead
of the percentage of the fund actually claimed by the class. For example, the
court in Tait v. BSH Home Appliances
Corporation was “concerned” about the presence of all three factors laid
out in Bedolla that indicate “class
counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests … to infect
negotiations”:
(1) ‘when counsel
receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement;’
(2) ‘when the
parties negotiate a “clear sailing” arrangement’ (i.e., an arrangement where
defendant will not object to a certain fee request by class counsel); and
(3) when the parties create a reverter that
returns unclaimed fees to the defendant.
No. SACV100711DOCANX, 2015 WL 4537463, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July
27, 2015), appeal dismissed (Jan. 13,
2016) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Predictably, the court’s
reluctance to grant final approval was due, in part, to the caution in Bedolla “that proportionality should be
determined with reference to the actual amount paid to the class” rather than
the nominal value of the settlement without taking into account the unclaimed
funds that would revert to the defendant. Id.
at *6.
Importantly, the “problematic incentives
inherent” in reversionary settlements caused the court to discount the views of
counsel regarding the quality of the settlement despite acknowledging that
“[c]ounsel on both sides of this case are experienced litigators” and that
“[c]lass counsel competently investigated and litigated the factual and legal
issues raised in this action….” Id.
at *8. Thus, a court might take a dim view of class counsel, even exceptionally
qualified and diligent class counsel, if they support a reversionary settlement
on behalf of the class.
In sharp
contrast to the cases discussed above, the court in Aichele v. City of Los Angeles – a class action brought on behalf
of peaceful protestors whose constitutional rights were violated by Los Angeles
police officers – granted plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees because “none
of the warning signs for a settlement that may be influenced by improper
favorable treatment of class counsel exists here.” No. CV1210863DMGFFMX, 2015
WL 5286028, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015). The court supported its decision,
in part, by reference to the fact that none of the “class fund revert to
Defendants, and [do not] result in a highly disproportionate fee in relation to
the actual (as opposed to theoretical) monetary recovery of the class.” Id.; see
also In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2015 WL 5158730,
at *14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (approving ~$40m in attorney’s fees for class
counsel in part because “Class Counsel [did not] agree that any portion of the
$415 million common fund could revert back to Defendants.”)
At best, reversionary
settlement agreements result in heightened judicial scrutiny of your proposed
class settlement and a judicial stink eye that may affect your reputation with
the court in the future. At worst, including a reversion will cause a court to
strike down what you have worked tirelessly to secure. With district courts
vigorously applying Bedolla and its
forbearers to class settlements, why risk including a reversion in your
hard-fought settlement?
Wednesday, June 3, 2015
Ninth Circuit Again Strongly Disapproves of Reversionary Settlements
Yesterday’s
decision by the Ninth Circuit in Allen
v. Bedolla is yet another
reason that class counsel should not agree to a reversionary settlement. As
discussed in previous posts to this blog in 2009 and 2014, as
well as other publications in 2010 and 2014,
such settlements should generally be rejected out of hand.

In Bedolla,
the Ninth Circuit vacated final approval of a settlement agreement with a reversion
to the defendant, again signaling its strong disapproval of such clauses. Allen v. Bedolla, WL 3461537
(9th Cir. June 2, 2015).
At issue in Bedolla were wage and hour complaints
regarding uncompensated waiting time violations and cash disbursement machines
that charged employees a fee to receive their paychecks. The parties settled
the case pre-certification for a gross settlement fund of $4.5 million.
However, the devil is in the details. All the money not paid towards attorney’s
fees, administrations costs, or to class members who submitted claims was
reverted to the defendant employer.
In vacating this settlement, the Ninth Circuit only reviewed the
settlement’s procedural fairness, i.e., whether the trial court properly
explained its decision that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate –
not whether the settlement itself was a good deal. Id. Following its decision in In re Bluetooth Headset Products
Liability Litigation, the court was troubled by the presence of a reverter
to the defendant because reversionary settlements are a “subtle sign[] that
class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests … to infect the
negotiations.” Id.
(internal citation omitted). Even more troubling was the fact that the
attorney’s fees award was three times the “maximum possible amount of class
monetary relief.” Id. The
appellate court was dismayed that these seemingly self-interested terms were
not thoroughly explained by the trial court, and accordingly, remanded the case
to seek more thorough justification of the reversionary provision (among other
worrisome settlement conditions).
The Ninth Circuit’s decision makes sense. As explained by the
Federal Judicial Center’s publication,
“Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges”:
A reversion clause creates perverse incentives for a defendant to
impose restrictive eligibility conditions and for class counsel and defendants
to use the artificially inflated settlement amount as a basis for attorney fees.
If you anticipate a low participation rate, as the attorneys in Bedolla did, then direct any unclaimed funds
on a pro rata basis to those class members who previously submitted claims. Bedolla, WL 3461537 at *5 n. 4
(“class counsel said that he would consider it a success if even 10% or 15% of
the class made claims”). For example, if a class member in the Bedolla case initially received $25, then that
member would receive $2.50 for every additional $1 received by a class member
that initially received $10. Pro rata distribution can be done in a second
payment, or (more cost-effectively) by increasing the allocations before the
initial distribution.
Another option is to designate a cy
pres beneficiary that
receives any unclaimed funds. This option is particularly advantageous when it
is difficult to contact class members or when the recovery for any one class
member is likely to be relatively low. One famous example is class members that
were overcharged on their taxi fares. Daar
v. Yellow Cab. Co., 135 Cal. 2d. 695 (1967). In such cases, the defendant
should not be able to benefit from low participation. Instead, a nonprofit that
serves the affected community should be awarded any unclaimed funds. For
example, in workers’ rights cases, funds should go to the Legal Aid
Society-Employment Law Center; Impact Fund; National Employment Law Association
Institute; the Foundation for Advocacy, Inclusion & Resources, or a similar
organization.
Whatever choice you make, avoid problematic reversionary
clauses, or risk your carefully negotiated settlement getting struck down on
appeal.
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